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About this report
This report outlines the ﬁ  ndings of the Economist Intelligence Unit’s in-depth analysis of the microﬁ  nance 
business environment in 54 countries. The index that underlies this report allows countries and regions 
to be compared across three broad categories: regulatory framework, institutional development and 
investment climate. The study uses a methodology which was originally developed for Latin America and 
the Caribbean in 2007 and was employed for the ﬁ  rst time on a global basis in 2009. Most of the research 
for this report was conducted prior to May 2010, although some later developments (up to July) were 
included where they were particularly signiﬁ  cant. Future studies will build on this project by increasing 
the number of interviews conducted, utilising new data, and reﬁ  ning the methodology. We welcome your 
feedback. Please contact us at Microﬁ  nance@economist.com.
This work was supported by ﬁ  nancing from the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF), a member of 
the Inter-American Development Bank Group; CAF (the Andean Development Corporation) and the 
Netherlands Technical Assistance Trust Fund at the International Finance Corporation (IFC).
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GlobalMicroscope, www.iadb.org/micamericas, www.caf.com/mipyme and www.ifc.org/microﬁ  nance.
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About the Economist Intelligence Unit
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) is the business information arm of The Economist Group, publisher 
of The Economist. Through a global network of more than 650 analysts and contributors, we continuously 
assess and forecast political, economic and business conditions in more than 200 countries. As the world’s 
leading provider of country intelligence, we help executives, governments and institutions by providing 
timely, reliable and impartial analysis on economic and development strategies. For more information, 
visit www.eiu.com.
About the Multilateral Investment Fund
The Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF), a member of the Inter-American Development Bank Group, 
provides grants, investments and loans to promote private sector growth, particularly micro and small 
businesses with high potential for poverty alleviation in Latin America and the Caribbean. For more 
information, visit www.iadb.org/mif.
About CAF
Established in 1970, CAF is a Latin American ﬁ  nancial institution created with the aim of promoting 
sustainable development and regional integration. The institution promotes sustainable growth in Latin 
America and the Caribbean by ﬁ  nancing projects in the public and private sectors, and by providing 
technical cooperation and other specialised services. CAF consists of 18 Latin American, Caribbean, 
and European governments as well as 14 private banks. It is a major source of multilateral ﬁ  nance and 
knowledge generation in the region. For more information, visit www.caf.com. 
About IFC
IFC, a member of the World Bank Group, is the largest global development institution focused on the 
private sector in developing countries. IFC creates opportunity for people to escape poverty and improve 
their lives by providing ﬁ  nancing to help businesses employ more people and supply essential services, 
by mobilising capital from others, and by delivering advisory services to ensure sustainable development. 
In a time of global economic uncertainty, IFC’s new investments climbed to a record $18 billion in ﬁ  scal 
2010. For more information, visit www.ifc.org.
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Microﬁ  nance is entering a new and more dynamic phase. In July 2010 India’s SKS became only the second 
microﬁ  nance institution ever to launch an initial public offering (IPO). SKS is well known in India, where 
it had almost 6 million active borrowers last year, but investors from several major US and European 
banks also bought shares in the IPO. This speaks volumes about new attitudes towards microﬁ  nance, 
which is increasingly viewed by both providers and investors as a commercially viable industry. Nor is the 
revolution in microﬁ  nance conﬁ  ned to India. Thanks to innovations in mobile microﬁ  nance, services like 
Kenya’s M-PESA (with 10 million customers) are using the latest communications technology to bring 
ﬁ  nance—and hope—to the world’s poorest countries. 
Indeed, microﬁ  nance is rapidly shifting from a niche product to a globally recognised form of ﬁ  nance. 
Yet as microﬁ  nance offerings become more sophisticated and diverse, regulatory and market gaps keep 
the industry from operating as well as it should. This increases the need for a systematic way of tracking 
and evaluating conditions for microﬁ  nance. 
The Global microscope on the microﬁ  nance business environment 2010 provides a basis for 
benchmarking the business conditions for privately provided microﬁ  nance in countries around the world. 
Commissioned and funded by MIF, CAF and IFC, the Global Microscope 2010 is the second annual effort to 
evaluate and benchmark 54 developing countries. It is also the fourth yearly index to track conditions in 
the 21 countries of the Latin American and Caribbean region. 
The 2010 index covers the period from August 2009 through May 2010, and evaluates microﬁ  nance 
across three distinct categories: 1) the regulatory framework, including ofﬁ  cial legal recognition, interest 
rate restrictions, market distortions, capital requirements and regulatory capacity; 2) the general 
investment climate for microﬁ  nance providers, especially accounting standards, governance tendencies 
and transparency requirements; and 3) the level of microﬁ  nance institutional development, as measured 
by market concentration, the range of services provided beyond credit and the quality of borrower 
information. Although it is impossible to capture every dimension of the microﬁ  nance environment, the 
index highlights countries that have improved ﬁ  nancing options for the poor and those that still have 
work to do.
Each year the Economist Intelligence Unit seeks to improve the methodology used to construct the 
index. A larger and more diverse group of stakeholders was interviewed this year. An online survey was 
conducted to solicit the views of an expanded community of microﬁ  nance specialists and in-country 
Executive summary © Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010 5
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stakeholders. The Microscope research team also nearly doubled in size, and new institutions were invited 
into the review process. New data and sources were also incorporated into the report.
Additional information on methodology and scoring is provided in the Microscope indicators section 
and in the appendix.© Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
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For the second year running, Peru, the Philippines, and Bolivia top the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 
Global Microscope index. Peru retained its position as the global leader, scoring 74.3 out of 100, similar 
to last year’s score. The Philippines and Bolivia swapped positions and ﬁ  nished second and third, 
respectively, this year. Two newcomers, Pakistan and Kenya, joined the top ten, displacing Nicaragua and 
Uganda. 
The three best-performing countries score especially well in two of the main index categories: 
regulatory framework and institutional development. Peru is the only country that ranks in the top ﬁ  ve 
for all three categories. The Philippines enjoys the best overall regulatory environment for microﬁ  nance, 
alongside Cambodia, which does not make the top ten overall, and Pakistan which does. As with the 
highest-ranked countries, the remaining top-ten nations come from different regions and exhibit varied 
macroeconomic and political characteristics. India, a large, fast-growing democracy, ranks eighth, just 
below its neighbour, ﬁ  fth-ranked Pakistan, which is less stable politically and economically. Ecuador and 
El Salvador, both with left-leaning governments, tie for sixth, ahead of ninth-placed Colombia, which has 
worked hard to improve its business environment in the last decade. The two African countries in the top 
ten, Ghana and Kenya, are among their region’s most stable economies. The countries that dropped from 
the top ranks have either experienced notable deteriorations in investment and operating conditions for 
microﬁ  nance since 2009 (Nicaragua, as a result of the “No Pago” movement) or have simply not kept pace 
(Uganda).
New to the bottom rank (54th place), Venezuela ﬁ  nishes last in the 2010 index. It replaces Thailand, 
in large part because of deteriorating investment and operating conditions for NGOs, but also because 
of slight improvements in Thailand, whose microﬁ  nance sector remains highly state-led. Microﬁ  nance 
in Venezuela suffers from a weak regulatory structure and low levels of market development. Although 
ranked just above Venezuela, three countries in the bottom ten—Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and 
Turkey—also lack the appropriate level of regulatory support and have underdeveloped markets. They are, 
however, unique in that relatively strong investment climates help to compensate for their weaknesses 
elsewhere. 
Two countries, Azerbaijan and Nepal, left the bottom ranks this year. Azerbaijan now places 38th and 
ties with China, thanks to improvements in its regulatory framework. Nepal beneﬁ  ted from a more hands-
off approach by the state and from new regulations that facilitate micro-deposit taking. Nepal is also in 
the process of drafting its ﬁ  rst microﬁ  nance law. 
Key ﬁ  ndings© Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010 7
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Changes since last year
Of the 54 countries included in the 2010 index, 29 improved their scores, 21 fell back, and four were 
unchanged. Madagascar posted the biggest improvement, largely because of its increasingly favourable 
regulatory framework, a wider range of microﬁ  nance services and efforts to improve credit reporting. 
Pakistan and Nepal had the second- and third-largest gains, helped by regulatory and market reforms. 
A comprehensive list of changes for 2010 can be viewed by score and by category in the Excel model, 
available free of charge at www.eiu.com/sponsor/GlobalMicroscope, www.iadb.org/micamericas, www.
caf.com/mipyme and www.ifc.org/microﬁ  nance.
Changes in methodology 
As the Microscope index has evolved from a pilot project to a more established global study, 
improvements in the data have been made and the number of interviews and contributing reviewers has 
been increased. This has occasionally led to adjustments in country evaluations even if a net change was 
not noted in a particular country since last year. 
A speciﬁ  c case worth mentioning is the inclusion of updated competition data from MIX Market 
and additional sources  and microﬁ  nance networks in Latin America and the Caribbean and Africa. 
Improvements in the ﬁ  gures and in number of institutions reported since last year led to both positive and 
negative changes for countries in this study. 
Finally, Ethiopia was not included this year due to a lack of corroborating information. The study will 
seek to re-incorporate Ethiopia in 2011.
A note on regional representation
This index builds on earlier studies of Latin America and the Caribbean; as a result, countries from that 
region are somewhat over-represented in the study (21 of 54). Countries in other regions were selected 
on the basis of the importance of their existing microﬁ  nance sectors or the potential for future market 
development. The study therefore provides differing levels of geographic coverage: 11 countries were 
selected from Sub-Saharan Africa, ﬁ  ve from South Asia, seven from East Asia, three from the Middle East 
and North Africa, and seven from Eastern Europe and Central Asia. These differences in coverage impact 
regional conclusions and should be considered carefully when evaluating index results beyond individual 
country scores.© Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
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East and South Asia
The Philippines and Pakistan ﬁ  ll the top regional ranks, scoring 64 points or more. They are followed 
by India and Cambodia, whose scores are almost ten points apart. Despite the apparent room for 
improvement (on a scoring scale of 0 to 100), these countries have frameworks in place that permit banks, 
non-bank ﬁ  nancial institutions (which may or may not enjoy a speciﬁ  c microﬁ  nance classiﬁ  cation), 
NGOs and cooperatives to offer microﬁ  nance services. These countries have also limited the extent and 
impact of state involvement in the sector (if any). A minimum and necessary level of regulatory capacity 
to oversee the active markets created by this approach has also been developed. One of the region’s 
strongest gainers since last year, Nepal, has made moves in this direction. 
The remaining eight countries score 40 points or less and struggle with regulatory conditions in 
particular. Bangladesh, which enjoys an elevated public proﬁ  le for microﬁ  nance (owing to the presence 
of Grameen Bank), ranks a mere 33rd and scores lower than it did in 2009. Bangladesh has a moderately 
restrictive regulatory framework that serves to constrain a majority of microﬁ  nance institutions, and has a 
fairly consolidated market. China and Mongolia also have restrictive frameworks, although market activity 
is far less robust in these locations than in Bangladesh; as a result they rank several spots lower.
Countries such as Thailand, Vietnam, Sri Lanka and Indonesia wrestle with both regulatory restrictions 
and signiﬁ  cant state intervention that impacts competition and market development. Indeed, Sri Lanka 
experienced the biggest score decrease of all the Asian countries in the study. In other cases, such as 
Indonesia, creative solutions are used to bypass these constraints and private providers have become 
active in microﬁ  nance. For the most part, though, government intervention through regulation and 
lending programmes creates a strong crowding-out effect. 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia
None of the Eastern European or Central Asian countries ﬁ  nished in the top ten. The region’s best 
performer, the Kyrgyz Republic, places 12th globally despite experiencing a slight decline in its 
overall score since last year. Turkey and Bosnia place in the top three worldwide for the quality of their 
investment climate, and another two countries in the region place in the top ten for their legal and 
regulatory frameworks (Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan). Despite noticeable regulatory capacity gaps 
Regional ﬁ  ndings© Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010 9
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in Turkey and Bosnia, the majority of the countries in the region enjoy at least some (if not signiﬁ  cant) 
specialised capacity for microﬁ  nance oversight. To their credit, governments in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia generally do not engage in direct ﬁ  rst or second-tier microlending1; rather, their weakness 
generally stems from a need to streamline regulations and change legal frameworks to allow or facilitate 
NGO participation in the sector. Turkey is the region’s most extreme case: the legal framework and 
regulatory environment actually serve as obstacles to the establishment of new microﬁ  nance institutions. 
Latin America and the Caribbean
As home to the overall best and worst performer in this year’s index, Latin America and the Caribbean has 
the largest range of scores among the six regions—a trend that is also evident among the three category 
scores. 
Interestingly, only three out of 21 countries place in the top ten for their regulatory and legal 
frameworks (Peru, Bolivia and Paraguay). Yet ﬁ  ve countries from the region place in the top ten overall 
(Peru, Bolivia, El Salvador, Ecuador and Colombia). This can be explained by the fact that non-regulatory 
measures, including market activity, services offered and credit bureau infrastructures, are relatively well-
established on a regional level. The relative dominance of Latin American countries in the institutional 
development category—they hold eight of the top ten slots—reinforces this point. 
Conversely, Latin America and the Caribbean house some of the most inactive markets. Countries 
such as Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica score at the bottom of the index overall and for 
at least two of the three categories. Nine countries exhibit high levels of market concentration and low 
competition, and the majority (14 out of 21) only offer a modest range of services. Of all countries in 
the region, Nicaragua lost the most points. This is mainly due to the negative effects of the “No Pago” 
movement on the regulatory environment and ﬁ  nancing conditions for microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs). 
Middle East and North Africa
The three Middle Eastern and North African countries examined in this study offer stark contrasts. The best 
performer is Yemen, ranking 27th globally despite high levels of political instability and economic stress. 
Yemen has developed and maintained a good regulatory framework for microﬁ  nance and has worked to 
strengthen regulatory capacity. The second-best performer regionally is Morocco. Although it has a highly 
active microcredit market, the range of services microﬁ  nance institutions are allowed to offer is restricted 
and the market is dominated by a few large players. The country’s investment climate for microﬁ  nance 
remains among the best in the world, however. The lack of microﬁ  nance-speciﬁ  c regulatory attention is 
strongly felt in Lebanon, where the market remains underdeveloped, under regulated and is fragmented 
along ethnic and political lines. 
Sub-Saharan Africa
Ghana and Kenya, two of Sub-Saharan Africa’s strongest and most stable countries, are leaders on 
a regional and global level, placing in the top ten overall. Uganda is close behind, ranking 11th. All 
three countries have strong regulatory frameworks that allow all types of microﬁ  nance institutions to 
1. The Kyrgyz Republic is an 
exception to this generalization, 
as a state-funded microlender 
began operations earlier this 
year.© Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
Global microscope on the microﬁ  nance 
business environment 2010
Regional ﬁ  ndings
10
serve low-income populations. Clients in these three countries beneﬁ  t from active markets in which 
institutions offer a wide range of services beyond microcredit; indeed, Kenya has a global reputation 
for innovation and dynamism in microﬁ  nance. The presence of savings and credit co-operatives in these 
countries contributes in large part to service availability and variety, though these institutions, when left 
unregulated, can also negatively inﬂ  uence governance and transparency standards. 
All 11 Sub-Saharan African countries examined in this study have microﬁ  nance-speciﬁ  c frameworks 
and policies in place, regardless of their regional or global rank. Some countries have begun improving 
their frameworks; Nigeria is reviewing existing policies to address rapid institutional growth, Kenya is re-
evaluating its framework governing institutional transformation, and Ghana has strengthened regulatory 
requirements for microﬁ  nance institutions. Some countries struggle with larger macroeconomic and 
government effectiveness issues that undermine the microﬁ  nance environment at a broader level 
(including the Democratic Republic of Congo, which had the biggest score decrease, and Madagascar 
which saw the most improvement). Others, such as Senegal and Cameroon, wrestle with the slow pace of 
regulatory implementation for reforms passed in prior years. However the regulatory framework in the 
region showed little evidence of deterioration over the past year. Ten of the 11 countries covered saw 
their regulatory framework scores either increase or hold steady. The greatest room for improvement is 
in credit bureau development, competition levels and investment climate. Nine of the 11 countries fall 
in the bottom half globally for investment climate, and they struggle to ensure minimum transparency, 
governance and accounting standards for microﬁ  nance.  © Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010 11
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Country rankings
  Rank   Country  Score  Score
       change
      since
      2009
 1  Peru  74.3  +0.5
 2  Philippines  71.8  +3.3
 3  Bolivia  69.6  -2.2
 4  Ghana  64.9  +4.0
 5  Pakistan  64.8  +8.3
 =6  Ecuador  61.3  +1.7
 =6  El  Salvador  61.3  +3.8
 8  India  59.1  -3.0
 9  Colombia  56.8  -1.8
 10  Kenya  55.0  -0.8
 11  Uganda  53.9  -3.6
  12  Kyrgyz Republic   53.0  -3.2
 13  Nicaragua  52.3  -6.3
 14  Chile  52.0  +4.0
 15  Paraguay  52.0  +2.5
 16  Cambodia  51.0  -3.2
 17  Panama  50.8  -
 18  Honduras  49.8  +0.5
 19  Guatemala  49.5  -2.3
 20  Dominican  Republic  48.7  +1.7
 21  Georgia  48.7  +3.7
 22  Armenia  47.6  +3.7
 23  Mexico  47.3  -
 24  Tanzania  46.2  -2.2
 25  Tajikistan  45.7  +5.3
 26  Brazil  45.0  +1.0
 27  Yemen  44.4  +2.3
  Rank   Country  Score  Score
       change
      since
      2009
 28  Nigeria  44.2  +4.8
 =29  Costa Rica  42.4  -
 =29  Rwanda  42.4  +3.9
 31  Madagascar  41.3  +9.0
 32  Bosnia  40.4  -2.7
 33  Bangladesh  39.5  -3.2
 34  Mozambique  38.6  -1.7
 35  Nepal  38.1  +8.1
 36  Cameroon  37.3  +5.7
 37  Argentina  36.7  +5.8
 =38  Azerbaijan  35.9  +7.0
 =38  China  35.9  +1.8
 40  Haiti  35.7  +2.3
 41  Indonesia  35.3  +0.2
 42  Sri  Lanka  34.2  -6.2
 43  Senegal  32.5  -0.1
 44  Mongolia  30.4  +0.4
 45  Morocco  30.3  -
 46  Uruguay  29.8  +1.5
  47  Democratic Republic of Congo  27.8  -9.1
 48  Turkey  27.4  -2.8
 49  Lebanon  26.3  -3.0
 50  Thailand  24.6  +3.3
 51  Jamaica  23.3  -0.3
 52  Vietnam  22.7  +1.2
  53  Trinidad and Tobago  21.9  -1.0
 54  Venezuela  21.6  -2.5
Overall microﬁ  nance business 
environment rankings
Weighted sum of category scores (0-100 where 100=most favourable)© Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010





 Weighted 40% in the overall index
  Rank   Country  Score  Score
       change
      since
      2009
 =1  Cambodia  87.5  -
 =1  Pakistan  87.5  +12.5
 =1  Philippines  87.5  -
 4  Peru  81.3  -
 =5  Bolivia  75.0  -6.3
 =5  Ghana  75.0  -
 =5  Kenya  75.0  -6.3
 =5  Kyrgyz  Republic  75.0  -6.3
 =5  Uganda  75.0  -
 =10  Paraguay  68.8  +6.3
 =10  Tajikistan  68.8  -
 =10  Tanzania  68.8  -
 =10  Yemen  68.8  +6.3
 =14  Ecuador  62.5  -6.3
 =14  El Salvador  62.5  -
 =14  India  62.5  -
 =14  Nigeria  62.5  +6.3
 =14  Rwanda  62.5  +6.3
 =19  Cameroon  56.3  +6.3
 =19  Colombia  56.3  -6.3
 =19  Georgia  56.3  -
 =19  Madagascar  56.3  +6.3
 =19  Mexico  56.3  -
 =19  Mozambique  56.3  -
 =19  Panama  56.3  -
 =26  Armenia  50.0  -
 =26  Brazil  50.0  -
 
 
  Rank   Country  Score  Score
       change
      since
      2009
 =26  Chile  50.0  -
 =26  Dominican Republic  50.0  -
 =26  Democratic Republic of Congo  50.0  -12.5
 =26  Honduras  50.0  -
 =32  Azerbaijan  43.8  +6.3
 =32  Bangladesh  43.8  -
 =32  Bosnia  43.8  -6.3
 =32  China  43.8  -
 =32  Costa Rica  43.8  -
 =32  Guatemala  43.8  -6.3
 =32  Haiti  43.8  -
 =32  Indonesia  43.8  -
 =32  Nicaragua  43.8  -12.5
 =32  Senegal  43.8  -
 =42  Lebanon  37.5  -
 =42  Mongolia  37.5  -6.3
 =42  Morocco  37.5  -
 =42  Nepal  37.5  +6.3
 =46  Argentina  31.3  +6.3
 =46  Uruguay  31.3  -
 =46  Vietnam  31.3  -
 =49  Jamaica  25.0  -
 =49  Sri Lanka  25.0  -6.3
 =49  Turkey  25.0  -
 =52  Thailand  18.8  +6.3
 =52  Venezuela  18.8  -6.3
  54  Trinidad and Tobago  12.5  -
 
Rankings by category© Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010 13




Weighted 20% in the overall index
  Rank   Country  Score  Score
       change
      since
      2009
 1  Chile  76.7  +3.3
 2  Turkey  70.6  +2.5
 3  Bosnia  64.7  -0.8
 4  Morocco  59.7  -
 5  Peru  59.2  +2.8
 =6  Brazil  58.3  +4.7
 =6  Kenya  58.3  +8.3
 =6  Panama  58.3  -
 9  Costa  Rica  58.1  -
 10  Ghana  57.8  +3.3
 11  Mexico  57.5  -
 12  Colombia  55.0  +3.6
 13  Armenia  54.7  +1.7
 14  India  53.6  +1.7
 15  Uruguay  53.3  +7.5
 16  Uganda  52.9  -1.3
  17  Trinidad and Tobago  51.1  -5.0
 18  Philippines  50.6  -
 19  Jamaica  50.0  -1.7
 20  Pakistan  49.2  -
 21  El  Salvador  48.3  +2.5
 =22  Bolivia  47.8  +1.7
 =22  Georgia  47.8  +1.7
 24  Mozambique  47.1  +8.2
 25  Cambodia  46.4  +0.8
 26  Mongolia  43.6  -2.0
 =27  Bangladesh  43.3  +0.8
 
  Rank   Country  Score  Score
       change
      since
      2009
 =27  Dominican Republic  43.3  +8.3
 =27  Guatemala  43.3  +0.8
 =27  Tanzania  43.3  +5.6
 =31  Azerbaijan  42.2  +5.8
 =31  China  42.2  +9.2
 33  Senegal  41.7  -0.3
 =34  Nicaragua  40.8  -6.7
 =34  Tajikistan  40.8  +10
 36  Lebanon  40.0  +1.7
 37  Indonesia  39.2  +0.8
 38  Paraguay  38.9  -
 39  Sri  Lanka  37.8  -1.7
 40  Argentina  37.5  -
 =41  Rwanda  37.2  +6.9
 =41  Venezuela  37.2  -
 43  Thailand  35.3  +4.2
 44  Yemen  34.7  -0.8
 45  Vietnam  34.4  +5.8
 46  Honduras  32.2  +2.5
 47  Nepal  31.9  +11.1
 =48  Ecuador  31.7  +4.2
 =48  Kyrgyz Republic  31.7  -3.3
 50  Nigeria  29.2  -5.0
 51  Madagascar  27.2  -0.8
 52  Haiti  24.4  -5.0
 53  Cameroon  23.9  -0.8
  54  Democratic Republic of Congo  22.2  -3.6
 © Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010





Weighted 40% in the overall index   
  Rank   Country  Score  Score
       change
      since
      2009
 =1  Bolivia  75.0  -
 =1  Ecuador  75.0  +8.3
 =1  Peru  75.0  -
 =4  El  Salvador  66.7  +8.3
 =4  Nicaragua  66.7  -
 =4  Philippines  66.7  +8.3
 =7  Colombia  58.3  -
 =7  Ghana  58.3  +8.3
 =7  Guatemala  58.3  -
 =7  Honduras  58.3  -
 =7  India  58.3  -8.3
 =12  Dominican Republic  50.0  -
 =12  Pakistan  50.0  +8.3
 =14  Argentina  41.7  +8.3
 =14  Armenia  41.7  +8.3
 =14  Chile  41.7  +8.3
 =14  Georgia  41.7  +8.3
 =14  Kyrgyz Republic  41.7  -
 =14  Nepal  41.7  +8.3
 =14  Panama  41.7  -
 =14  Paraguay  41.7  -
 =14  Sri Lanka  41.7  -8.3
 =23  Bangladesh  33.3  -8.3
 =23  Brazil  33.3  -
 =23  Costa Rica  33.3  -
 =23  Haiti  33.3  +8.3
 =23  Kenya  33.3  -
  Rank   Country  Score  Score
       change
      since
      2009
 =23  Madagascar  33.3  +16.7
 =23  Mexico  33.3  -
 =23  Nigeria  33.3  +8.3
 =23  Uganda  33.3  -8.3
 =32  Azerbaijan  25.0  +8.3
 =32  Bosnia  25.0  -
 =32  Cameroon  25.0  +8.3
 =32  China  25.0  -
 =32  Indonesia  25.0  -
 =32  Rwanda  25.0  -
 =32  Tajikistan  25.0  +8.3
 =32  Tanzania  25.0  -8.3
 =32  Thailand  25.0  -
 =32  Yemen  25.0  -
 =42  Cambodia  16.7  -8.3
 =42  Mongolia  16.7  +8.3
 =42  Mozambique  16.7  -8.3
 =42  Senegal  16.7  -
 =42  Trinidad and Tobago  16.7  -
 =42  Uruguay  16.7  -
 =42  Venezuela  16.7  -
 =49  Democratic Republic of Congo  8.3  -8.3
 =49  Jamaica  8.3  -
 =49  Lebanon  8.3  -8.3
 =49  Morocco  8.3  -
 =49  Turkey  8.3  -8.3
 =49  Vietnam  8.3  -Global microscope on the microﬁ  nance 
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Microscope indicators
The 13 indicators for this index, and the categories into which they are subdivided, are as follows:
Regulatory framework
1) Regulation of microcredit operations
2) Formation and operations of regulated/supervised specialised MFIs
3) Formation and operation of non-regulated MFIs
4) Regulatory and examination capacity
Investment climate
1) Political stability
2) Capital market stability
3) Judicial system
4) Accounting standards for microﬁ  nance
5) Governance standards for microﬁ  nance
6) MFI transparency
Institutional development
1) Range of services offered by MFIs 
2) Credit bureaus for microﬁ  nance
3) Level of competition in the microﬁ  nance sector
Scoring methodology: Each of the 13 scoring criteria are scored from 0 to 4, where 4= best and 0 = worst. 
Ten of the 13 indicators receive integer scores. The remaining three (Political stability, Capital market 
stability, and Judicial system) are an average of several sub-indicators, thereby producing decimal scores 
in some cases. 
Once indicator scores have been assigned, these are aggregated to produce an overall scoring range 
of 0 – 100, where 100= best. Overall scores and rankings were calculated by attributing a 40% weight to 
Regulatory framework and Institutional development category scores and a 20% weight to the Investment 
climate category score. For a detailed description of the scoring methodology, please refer to the 
appendix.© Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
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The following section provides a brief proﬁ  le of the microﬁ  nance business environment and indicates key 
changes since last year for each of the 54 countries in this study. Countries are listed in alphabetical order 
and are organised by region. Each country proﬁ  le is presented in two parts: the ﬁ  rst section contains a 
brief background on a country’s microﬁ  nance sector, and the second section outlines key developments 
since last year. Please note that the information selected for the country proﬁ  les is meant to be a high-
level overview. It is not intended to provide a complete outline of the legal environment or represent a 
comprehensive account of all recent activity. For more in-depth analysis and regulatory detail, please 
visit the “country proﬁ  le” tab of the Excel model available free of charge at www.eiu.com/sponsor/
GlobalMicroscope, www.iadb.org/micamericas, www.caf.com/mipyme and www.ifc.org/microﬁ  nance.
Microﬁ  nance country proﬁ  lesGlobal microscope on the microﬁ  nance 
business environment 2010
Microﬁ  nance country proﬁ  les
© Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010 17
Bangladesh
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are regulated by the Microcredit Regulatory Authority (MRA), 
whereas banks are regulated by Bangladesh Bank (the central bank). Grameen Bank, the country’s 
largest microﬁ  nance institution (MFI), is regulated by a separate law that established the Grameen 
Bank Project as a specialised bank in 1983. 
l Microﬁ  nance is well-established and the market continues to grow, despite exceptionally high market 
penetration. Although many MFIs operate in Bangladesh, the top ten account for 87% of total savings 
and 81% of total loans. 
l  The lack of effective credit bureaus for microﬁ  nance transactions, a ban on deposit-taking by MFIs 
from non-members, and the current prohibition on the use of mobile technology by MFIs restricts the 
expansion of microﬁ  nance operations. 
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  Internal and external threats to the stability of the government and the political system have been 
greatly reduced since civilian rule resumed in January 2009. The risk of ad hoc policy reversals or 
populist interventions in the microﬁ  nance sector is low. 
l  The Microcredit Regulatory Authority (MRA) has become more proactive in enforcing the national 
policy framework passed in 2006 for NGO-MFIs. The MRA has made progress in developing licensing 
standards for MFIs, has increased consultations with MF stakeholders and is gradually building its still-
minimal capacity (stafﬁ  ng is limited and the MRA has no ofﬁ  ce outside the capital). 
l  As of June 2010 the MRA was preparing draft rules to enforce interest rate regulations and to restrict 
NGO-MFIs’ ability to receive and mobilise compulsory deposits. 
l High  inﬂ  ation has eroded the disposable incomes of the poor and has led to a marginal decline in 
repayments. This has increased pressure on the central bank and the MRA to reduce or restrain interest 
rates in the sector.
l  Both the MRA and MFIs are keen to see the creation of credit bureaus. The number of borrowers with 
multiple loans has increased, as evidenced by a report from the Bangladesh Institute of Development 
Studies which found that about 15% of microﬁ  nance households had loans from multiple MFIs, 
suggesting high indebtedness. 
East and South Asia © Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
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Cambodia
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  Licensing, regulation, and supervision of microﬁ  nance are conducted by the National Bank of 
Cambodia (NBC, the central bank) under the Law on Banking and Financial Institutions (LBFI) of 
1999. The regulatory framework permits limited liability companies (LLCs, including banks) to offer 
microcredit services. So far, only one bank is active in microﬁ  nance. 
l  A framework for upgrading from non-governmental organisation (NGO) status exists, and the NBC 
actively encourages the transformation of microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs) into regulated institutions. 
In accordance with the LBFI, MFIs meeting certain portfolio or borrower-size criteria are required to 
become licensed as an LLC or a co-operative. 
l  The role of international NGOs in creating many of the leading MFIs, and the desire to attract foreign 
investors, has led to relatively strong governance standards. Representatives of international 
institutions sit on most MFI boards, and internal audit and control functions are well developed. 
l  The NBC has a strong commitment to transparency in the sector. It collects and publicises the interest 
rates of all ﬁ  nancial institutions on a quarterly basis. The charging of ﬂ  at interest rates is outlawed, so 
all microﬁ  nance providers charge interest on the declining balance of the loan. Almost all the major 
MFIs have received an external rating, as this is required by international investors. 
l  The onset of the global ﬁ  nancial and economic crisis revealed a severe over-indebtedness problem in 
the Cambodian microﬁ  nance sector. A plan to create a credit bureau exists, but it is not expected to be 
operational before 2011. 
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  The NBC has eased the process for non-bank ﬁ  nancial institution-MFIs (NBFI-MFIs) to win permission 
to take deposits. Four NBFI-MFIs already have licences, and others have submitted applications.
l  There are no ofﬁ  cial mobile money regulations in Cambodia. However, the ﬁ  rst mobile payments 
programme in the country was launched in January 2009 by WING, a subsidiary of the Australia and 
New Zealand Banking Group (ANZ). Expansion of this service is held back by the requirement to use 
local currency, as Cambodia is highly dollarised. Institutions (including MFIs) generally lend in dollars 
to avoid exchange-rate risk. 
l  A new NGO law is being drafted that could restrict for-proﬁ  t activities, such as microﬁ  nance. However, 
the details of the draft legislation have yet to be ﬁ  nalised and it remains to be seen how it will impact 
on the MFI-NGO segment. At the same time, a draft law (the Financial Trust Law) has been prepared 
and is currently in formal revision stages. If passed, the law would help MFIs clarify their ownership 
structures.Global microscope on the microﬁ  nance 
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China
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l Microﬁ  nance is in its infancy in China and there is little competition among the main players, owing to 
their small size and wide geographical distribution. Usually, not more than one microcredit company 
(MCC) is active is any given county. Regulatory restrictions help to explain why most microﬁ  nance 
institutions (MFIs) remain relatively contained geographically. This is especially the case for sector 
institutions such as village and township banks (VTBs). 
l  The regulatory capacity of the People’s Bank of China (PBC, the central bank) and China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC) are relatively strong, so the institutions that fall under their authority 
are well regulated. MCCs are supervised by provincial government ﬁ  nancial ofﬁ  ces, whose capacity 
is much weaker. Given the rapid expansion of MCCs in the last two years, this is a major concern, 
although it is unlikely to imperil ﬁ  nancial sector stability, as they do not take deposits. 
l  The China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA) enjoys a privileged position owing to its ties 
with the state, and can lobby effectively within the regulatory system. CFPA is in theory a non-
governmental organisation (NGO), but it emerged from a poverty-alleviation programme. The state’s 
past view of microﬁ  nance as a poverty-alleviation tool has hindered the development of proﬁ  table 
microﬁ  nance, notably by distorting customer expectations. 
l  It is relatively difﬁ  cult and unusual for lightly regulated institutions, such as the MCCs, to upgrade into 
deposit-taking institutions like VTBs. It is more common to see regular banks moving into downscale 
lending via VTBs.
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  The CRBC does not appear to support a rapid expansion of VTBs; as of end-2009 there were around 
150. Rural credit co-operatives (RCCs) were formerly ineffective as a vehicle for ﬁ  nancing small 
loans in rural areas, partly owing to a very conservative approach to loan issuance and the difﬁ  culty 
of persuading loan ofﬁ  cers to approve loans. Their provision of microcredit has, however, recently 
improved. 
l  Although the China Credit Reference Centre (CRC, the central credit bureau) is reasonably 
comprehensive, most MFIs do not yet participate in the system. The government has undertaken 
consultations on a new law that would regulate credit bureaus (excluding the CRC).
l  The Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) extended an Rmb200m (US$29.5m) loan to the CFPA in 2009. 
This loan should help the CFPA increase the scale of its microﬁ  nance operations signiﬁ  cantly.
l  The services offered by MFIs depend on their legal status. MFIs that are regulated by the CBRC can 
offer a wide variety of services, including deposit-taking and other banking services. However, 
those not under the CBRC, such as MCCs and unregulated MFIs, are essentially limited to lending 
and offering ﬁ  nancial consultation services. There are some tentative projects underway in the ﬁ  eld 
of microinsurance, especially in poorer regions, but the insurance regulator, the China Insurance 
Regulatory Commission, has not been enthusiastic in its promotion of this concept.© Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
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India
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l The  microﬁ  nance sector has continued to grow rapidly and with it the need for better regulation. The 
proposed Microﬁ  nance Bill has been pending in Parliament since 2007, although it is expected to pass 
in 2010. However, the bill does not cover non-bank ﬁ  nancial companies (NBFCs) and microﬁ  nance 
institutions (MFIs) registered as not-for-proﬁ  t companies, thereby ignoring over 80% of the 
microﬁ  nance sector. 
l  The Reserve Bank of India (RBI, the central bank) regulates two types of institutions that engage 
in microﬁ  nance activities: banks and NBFCs. There are also Self-Help Groups (SHGs) that operate 
as informal credit and savings groupings of 5-30 poor individuals. Under the proposed bill, the 
National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) would be responsible for regulating, 
registering and overseeing the microﬁ  nance activity of SHGs and NGO-MFIs. A real possibility is a 
regime with two regulators—RBI for NBFCs and banks and NABARD for SHGs and NGO-MFIs.
l  Although they are the largest MFIs, NBFCs are not allowed to accept ﬁ  xed-term deposits without 
special approval, which requires an investment grade rating from a credit rating agency. Both 
regulatory approval and credit ratings have become increasingly difﬁ  cult, if not impossible, to obtain. 
NGO-MFIs are currently prohibited from accepting deposits; however, the Micro Financial Sector Bill 
pending in parliament since 2007 could open up deposit-taking restrictions on NGO-MFIs. 
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  Under two separate circulars issued in 2009, domestic banks are required to lend 10% of their adjusted 
net bank credit to weaker players, such as SHGs, or to MFIs that lend to SHGs. 
l A  Microﬁ  nance Credit Information Bureau is being created; it will pool borrowers’ details from 34 
participating NBFC-MFIs that are part of the Microﬁ  nance Institutions Network (MFIN, a regulatory 
organisation). Moreover, existing credit bureaus are actively involved in a collective effort to 
standardise data collection from MFIs, as well as to settle on a common data format. 
l  The central bank has allowed 29 banks to operate mobile-based payment services. Some pilots have 
involved MFIs, but there has been no widespread roll-out of the service. 
l  As of 1st July 2010, RBI lifted interest rate restrictions on small loans provided by commercial banks in 
an effort to increase the level of competition in the microﬁ  nance sector. Previously, interest rates for 
all loans under Rs200,000 (around US$4,300) from commercial banks had to be set at a level equal to 
or below the bank’s benchmark Prime Lending Rate.Global microscope on the microﬁ  nance 
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Indonesia
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  Commercial banks are the most important providers of microcredit in Indonesia, accounting for 
around 90% of loans.
l  The government-backed Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) is the largest single microﬁ  nance provider 
through its Unit Desa ofﬁ  ces. It mainly operates on a commercial model, but is also responsible for 
rolling out government ﬁ  nance schemes, which give them a competitive advantage over private 
microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs). 
l  Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Indonesia are usually organised as foundations. However, 
legally they must convert into a commercial bank, co-operative, or a Bank Perkreditan Rakyat (BPR, 
people’s credit bank) or a venture capital ﬁ  rm in order to provide microﬁ  nance. The conversion process 
into a bank is considered onerous, and few NGO-MFIs take this route. A number of prominent NGO-MFIs 
have converted into venture capital ﬁ  rms. 
l  Commercial banks with microﬁ  nance operations are regulated by the Bank of Indonesia (the central 
bank). BPRs are also regulated by the central bank, and there is some discussion of adopting a ratings-
based approach to BPRs, rather than subjecting them to formal on- and off-site supervision. Non-bank 
MFIs (NBFIs) lack clarity over their legal status and eligibility to mobilise deposits. Village credit 
organisations are regulated by BRI branches, and co-operative MFIs are regulated by the Ministry of 
Co-operatives, but in practice there is little effective oversight of either type. 
l  Governance standards in Indonesia are weak, and managerial quality at many BPRs, co-operatives, 
and semiformal microﬁ  nance providers is low. Regulators provide only limited technical assistance, 
mostly focused on BPRs. 
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  The government launched a scheme in 2010 to encourage savings by offering savings accounts that 
have no administration fees and require initial deposits of just Rp10,000 (US$1.1) at rural banks and 
Rp20,000 at commercial banks. Only BRI will be operating this scheme.
l  Plans to shift supervisory authority over commercial banks to a newly established ﬁ  nancial services 
agency remain on indeﬁ  nite hold. The institution’s launch has been repeatedly delayed since 2004, 
and the central bank is likely to remain the key banking regulator for the foreseeable future. 
l  Demand for microﬁ  nance services far outstrips supply throughout the country. Several large 
commercial banks besides BRI already offer microﬁ  nance services. These are becoming more 
expansion-minded and others are clearly poised to begin serving the sector.  © Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
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Mongolia
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  Commercial banks are the primary providers of formal microﬁ  nance in Mongolia. These institutions 
are governed by banking laws and are regulated by the Bank of Mongolia (the central bank). There are 
only a handful of signiﬁ  cant, regulated non-bank ﬁ  nancial institutions (NBFIs), although some small-
scale microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs) operate outside of the law or on the basis of ad hoc agreements 
with the government.
l  Mongolia has a relatively developed microﬁ  nance sector, with a high degree of outreach. However, 
two commercial banks (Khan Bank and XacBank) dominate the market.
l  Banks are permitted to take deposits, but NBFIs are not.
l  Partly owing to the inﬂ  uence of foreign investors, accounting and governance standards in the 
leading MFIs tend to be higher than the average for Mongolia’s ﬁ  nancial sector. However, many 
NBFIs and savings and credit co-operatives (SACCOs) lack management experience and do not follow 
international management practices. 
l  Mobile banking services (m-banking) exist and are used by both Khan Bank and XacBank, and licensed 
NBFIs can also offer these services. However, there is no legal framework for overseeing agencies 
involved in m-banking.
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  A private credit bureau was legally incorporated in Mongolia in 2009 and preparations for full 
operation are underway. It has 18 shareholders, including Khan Bank and XacBank. 
l  The Financial Regulatory Commission is now inspecting non-deposit-taking lenders, insurance 
companies and SACCOs on a regular basis. However, lack of transparency remains a problem. 
l  The non-bank SACCOs experienced a serious downturn in 2008 when global commodity prices fell 
sharply in response to the international ﬁ  nancial crisis. Two mid-sized banks have since gone into 
receivership—although the country’s top banks (which account for the majority of ﬁ  nancial system 
assets) look more stable.
Nepal
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  The main formal providers are upscaled non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and regional rural 
development banks (RRDBs); as of April 2010 there were 18 of these institutions in operation.
l  RRDBs were formerly state-run, but four out of ﬁ  ve are now privately owned. The largest government 
player is the Agricultural Development Bank, which provides wholesale funds to related standalone 
co-operatives (Small Farmer Co-operatives).
l  Private-sector institutions that were created by greenﬁ  eld or upscaled NGOs are ofﬁ  cially classiﬁ  ed as 
microcredit development banks (MCDBs). 
l  Public and private institutions are regulated identically. Although there are no interest rate Global microscope on the microﬁ  nance 
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restrictions in Nepal, the role of government institutions has kept lending rates unsustainably low, at 
18-25%. 
l  As of April 2010, 45 ﬁ  nancial intermediary NGOs (FINGOs) were in operation and are currently 
registered with the Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB, the central bank). FINGOS and MCDBs can take deposits 
from their members. FINGOs also have a limited banking licence, which allows them to borrow from 
commercial banks for client-lending purposes. These borrowings usually fall under the mandatory 
deprived-sector lending portfolio of commercial banks. 
l  Savings and credit co-operatives (SACCOs) are key microﬁ  nance providers; several thousand are 
estimated to exist, of which only 16 have a limited banking licence from the NRB. As of June 2009,  639 
SACCOs were members of the Nepal Federation of Savings and Credit Co-operatives, covering 325,000 
clients.
l  Mobile banking is non-existent in Nepal at present. A handful of pilot projects have been implemented 
and more banks have plans to start them. This is not, however, a priority for mobile service providers, 
and there is no regulatory framework for this kind of service in the ﬁ  nancial sector or within 
microﬁ  nance speciﬁ  cally.
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  Based on a central bank directive issued in August 2009, several banks and ﬁ  nancial services providers 
have applied to open microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs) as subsidiary companies.
l  In March 2010 the NRB opened the door for MCDBs to collect voluntary deposits from the public (in 
addition to their members). This was meant to address resource constraints and competitive pressures 
facing independent MFIs now that banks and other ﬁ  nancial institutions can invest in their own 
subsidiary MFIs following the 2009 directive.
l  The country is developing  its ﬁ  rst microﬁ  nance law. Currently, a draft of the Microﬁ  nance Act includes 
plans to establish a separate regulatory organisation to supervise microﬁ  nance development banks 
and ﬁ  nancial intermediary NGOs. Ongoing political instability, however, threatens the promulgation 
of the Act.
Pakistan
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l All  microﬁ  nance providers are required to register either with the Security and Exchange Commission 
of Pakistan (SECP), the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP, the central bank), or their respective provincial 
authority. The SBP’s supervisory capacity is considered strong. 
l  In 2005 the SBP issued guidelines permitting non-governmental organisation-microﬁ  nance 
institutions (NGO-MFIs), rural support programmes (RSPs) and co-operatives to transform into formal 
microﬁ  nance banks (MFBs). Specialised MFBs are the most important service providers in Pakistan. 
Five are active at a national level and two are active at the district level. Microﬁ  nance banks face the 
same prudential regulations as commercial banks and can offer the same range of services to their 
clients. © Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
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l  Provincial government-backed ﬁ  nancial institutions, such as the Bank of Khyber, and institutions 
that were launched with an endowment from the government, such as the National Rural Support 
Programme (NRSP), do not distort the market. 
l  At the end of 2009 there were 2.35m micro-savers in the country, more than the number of borrowers 
(1.8m). However, many of those savers are part of borrower groups who are required to save to receive 
a loan. In fact, 56% of the savers as a whole are members of the NRSP. The number of voluntary micro-
savers at MFBs numbered only 450,000 at the end of 2009.
l  The range of products offered by MFBs remains focused on credit, based on group-lending 
methodologies. Micro-insurance has begun to move beyond the traditional credit-life product offering 
to health and hospitalisation insurance, as in the case of the NSRP. At the end of 2009 there were 3.3m 
micro-insurance policy holders in Pakistan, nearly double the number of borrowers.
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  In 2009 the central bank issued a number of new rules supporting microﬁ  nance banks (MFBs), such 
as lifting regulations that prevented them from accepting foreign currency loans from international 
investors. The limits on borrowers’ annual income were revised upward from PRs150,000 (US$1,780) 
to PRs300,000 for general loans, and PRs600,000 for housing loans. Also, the loan classiﬁ  cation 
criteria for MFBs were aligned with international best practice and industry norms.
l  The Pakistan Microﬁ  nance Network (PMN), a sector association with 26 MFI members, plans to set up 
a credit bureau. The bureau will be pilot-tested in the most populous district, Lahore, before being 
rolled out nationwide in 2011. 
l  Islamic banking is expected to come to Pakistan’s microﬁ  nance sector in 2010 with the opening of an 
Islamic branch by the NGO-MFI, Asaha. Once the branch opens, Asaha plans on converting 27 existing 
branches into a Sharia-compliant network.
Philippines
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  Since the adoption of a National Strategy for Microﬁ  nance in 1997, the government has promoted 
a regulatory and policy framework that is conducive to microﬁ  nance activity. The government has 
encouraged the establishment of microﬁ  nance banks (MFBs) and the commercialisation of the 
microﬁ  nance sector, and has speciﬁ  cally promoted the upgrading of non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs). 
l  Downscaling is also legal and fairly straightforward. However, commercial banks have withdrawn the 
few attempts made to provide retail microﬁ  nance services, preferring to act as wholesale funders to 
the sector instead. 
l  There are no regulatory restrictions on the ability of microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs), whether banks 
or NGO-MFIs, to accept debt investment from international investors in foreign currency. However, 
rural banks are prevented from taking foreign equity investments. 
l  The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP, the central bank) requires all regulated MFIs to disclose Global microscope on the microﬁ  nance 
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effective interest rates and to be audited by an external auditor. However, NGO-MFIs, which are among 
the largest providers in the country, are unregulated and thus not obligated to disclose information 
under these provisions. 
l  Although still very much credit-oriented, MFIs in the Philippines are able to offer a variety of services, 
and many do. Regulated MFIs can accept deposits, and those linked to the international payments 
system can accept remittances. 
l  Clients in the Philippines have a wide choice of service providers, including local and national 
institutions. There are a relatively small number of national microﬁ  nance providers and many smaller 
local ones. The top ten service providers account for just over half of all loans outstanding in the sector 
and 66% of all clients. 
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  In 2010 BSP began allowing rural, co-operative, and thrift banks to sell authorised micro-insurance 
products. These institutions can be licensed as micro-insurance agents, and can only sell policies up to 
Php190,000 (around US$4,000) under certain provisions. 
l  In April 2010 the BSP issued a circular that set the rules for accrediting microﬁ  nance rating agencies, 
a move seen as encouraging local MFIs to be rated. Until recently, it was rare for microﬁ  nance banks 
(MFBs), rural banks, or thrift banks with microﬁ  nance operations to become externally rated. 
l  In 2010 BSP issued rules on the extension of housing microﬁ  nance and eased requirements for micro-
lending in agriculture.
l  The Credit Information System Act signed into law in September 2008 requires all regulated entities 
to submit positive and negative information to a new credit bureau under the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). However, the establishment of the Central Credit Information Corporation (CCIC) 
has not yet resulted in the operation of a functioning, active credit bureau, despite the fact that 
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) were approved in May 2009. According to local press, 
operations are now expected to begin in the third quarter of 2010.
l  In 2009 the Bank of the Philippine Islands and one of the two main mobile telephone service 
providers, Globe, formed a joint venture to launch mobile-oriented retail microﬁ  nance. 
Sri Lanka
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  There is no speciﬁ  c regulation governing the microﬁ  nance sector, which has led to a variety of 
different regulatory regimes and the lack of a level playing ﬁ  eld between microﬁ  nance institutions 
(MFIs). As a result, many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) operate in what amount to 
regulatory “black holes”.
l  The regulated microﬁ  nance sector consists of rural development banks (RDBs) and similar specialist 
banks; the Samurdhi Bank Societies (SBSs), co-operative rural banks (CRBs); the thrift and credit co-
operative societies (TCCSs) of the SANASA network; NGO-MFIs; and other ﬁ  nancial entities, including 
commercial banks and ﬁ  nance companies.© Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
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l  Interest rates are not circumscribed by regulation, but the market is heavily distorted by a high level 
of state-led intervention. The government often regards microﬁ  nance services as a welfare issue, and 
sometimes applies political pressure to give free loans or cap interest rates. Some MFIs themselves 
place greater focus on social welfare activities, leading to conﬂ  icts of interest that impede the 
commercialisation of microcredit.
l  Many MFIs offer broad product portfolios that generally consist of loans differing in name and tenure. 
Licensed and specialised banks mobilise deposits, while NGO-MFIs impose compulsory savings 
requirements on their loans. Government suspicions about the risks of MFIs expanding into new 
services impede the diversiﬁ  cation of the sector. 
l  Financial institutions that lend to MFIs and to microﬁ  nance clients consider their clients a 
homogeneous demographic. This is not the case, however, and inadvertently directs services toward 
institutions and clients with incomes well above the poverty line. 
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  The North and East of the island, which include some of the island’s poorest regions, provide an 
opportunity for the expansion of microﬁ  nance services. 
l  The National Development Trust Fund (NDTF) in 2009 imposed a cap of 15% on interest rates for on-
lending of its funds. At such a low rate, there is little commercial incentive for banks to expand into 
microcredit.
l  The electoral season in early 2010 (when presidential and parliamentary elections were held) may 
have exerted pressure on MFIs to write off and extend loans at unproﬁ  table rates. This has not been 
conﬁ  rmed, however.
l  NGO-MFIs are having a harder time obtaining capital, as donor funds associated with the 2004 Indian 
Ocean tsunami recovery effort are running out. 
l  In March 2010 plans were announced to introduce a Microﬁ  nance Act later in the year. No details have 
been conﬁ  rmed, although early reports suggest that it will be substantially different than the previous 
draft of a similar name.
l  In 2009 the government launched the Vadakkin Vasantham special loan scheme for the Northern 
province, which provides SLRs3bn (around US$26m) to ﬁ  nance loans to micro-, small and medium-
sized enterprises at a concessionary rate of 9%. The subsidised interest rate continues a government 
trend of using subsidised lending for welfare purposes, which crowds out commercial microﬁ  nance 
activity.Global microscope on the microﬁ  nance 
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Thailand
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l Microﬁ  nance in Thailand is generally a government-sponsored activity. Although there is a 
commitment to the provision of microloans through local “village funds”, this has stiﬂ  ed the 
development of private sector provision. The Bank of Thailand (BOT, the central bank) is keen on 
making changes, and has unveiled a plan affording opportunities to new and qualiﬁ  ed microﬁ  nance 
service providers to enter the market. 
l  That said, the BOT has yet to prove that it has developed the specialised capacity to regulate or 
supervise microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs). 
l  Under the Civil Procedure Code, an interest rate ceiling of 15% is in place for lending by unofﬁ  cial 
ﬁ  nancial institutions. In practice, lending rates by unofﬁ  cial lenders are higher than this. The central 
bank has set a ceiling of 28% for combined interest and charges on all personal consumer and credit 
card loans;  according to local commentators, this prevents some small-scale credit companies from 
offering microcredit. Other loans, such as corporate loans, are not subject to caps on interest rates
l  Large state-owned specialised ﬁ  nancial institutions dominate the microﬁ  nance market. Since 
competition is constrained by government players, there has been no adoption of international 
accounting standards. 
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  Under the Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP) Phase II for 2010-14, which was unveiled in late 
2009, the authorities intend to relax some regulations to allow new domestic or foreign microﬁ  nance 
providers to set up operations. The new plan will also permit commercial banks to establish afﬁ  liate 
companies to provide microﬁ  nance and tie up with other operations (such as co-operatives) to provide 
services. The BOT and Ministry of Finance intend to consider new licences on a case-by-case basis, 
subject to applicants’ qualiﬁ  cations and the guidelines set.
l  Although the FSMP Phase II plan has been unveiled, the practical implications of the new regulations 
have not yet been detailed, and the stated plans have generally met with a negative response from 
existing microﬁ  nance providers.
l  A state-owned specialised ﬁ  nancial institution, the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Co-
operatives (BAAC), is planning to launch a new Village Banking programme in 2010, with a loan fund 
of Bt3bn (US$93m) and which will offer subsidised interest rates. The introduction of BAAC is expected 
to further limit competition from small-scale private institutions. © Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
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Vietnam
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l The  microﬁ  nance sector in Vietnam is dominated by the Vietnam Bank for Social Policy (VBSP), which 
disburses heavily subsided loans. There are other government programmes and institutions, which, 
along with VBSP, comprise around 90% of microcredit in the country. 
l  The few private semi-formal microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs) that exist are geographically limited and 
mainly offer services to members of the “mass organisations” with which they are afﬁ  liated. The only 
sizeable semi-formal MFIs are Capital and Fund for Employment of the Poor (CEP, in Ho Chi Minh City), 
and Tao Yeu May (TYM, in Hanoi). Given their different locations, they do not compete with each other, 
although they both compete with the VBSP.
l  The supervisory capacity of the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV, the central bank) for microﬁ  nance is 
considered weak. The SBV is thought to focus more on compliance than supervision of ﬁ  nancial 
institutions, but the lack of progress in issuing licences to semi-formal MFIs is symptomatic of the 
central bank’s inability to adequately assess regulatory compliance.
l  The range of services offered by MFIs is limited. Although loans are widely available, other services, 
such as risk-management products, are neglected. State-owned banks focus more on providing cheap 
credit than mobilising savings, while the semi-formal MFIs are not allowed to take voluntary deposits. 
l  Accounting and governance standards are generally poor. In the microﬁ  nance sector, state-owned 
providers follow Vietnamese Accounting Standards, which fall short of international best practice. The 
semi-formal MFIs have not adopted any international standards either, as they are prohibited from 
accepting foreign investment. 
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  Although new regulations have been introduced that provide a legal foundation to formalise MFIs 
and incorporate them into the ﬁ  nancial system, the SBV is still in the process of ﬁ  nalising legislation 
that will guide regulatory implementation. The SBV has indicated that it will not be able to issue 
any licences until 2011 at the earliest. Until then, semi-formal MFIs will continue to face a host of 
operational difﬁ  culties, such as the inability to mobilise deposits and access foreign funds. 
l  In late 2009 the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction announced 
the provision of a US$1.5m grant aimed at assisting the government in formalising the provision of 
microﬁ  nance by private institutions under the new regulatory environment. Staff at MFIs receiving 
support will receive training on compliance and international best practice.
l  The SBV lifted restrictions on interest-rate setting for semi-formal MFIs effective March 2010. The cap 
on rates for loans was previously 150% of the base rate of the SBV. 
l  A new decree on credit information was enacted in February 2010, creating the legal framework for the 
establishment and operation of private credit bureaus (PCBs). Potential PCBs may become operational 
in 2011. A public registry exists, but is not available to MFIs. Global microscope on the microﬁ  nance 
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Armenia
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  There is no law speciﬁ  c to microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs), although a 2002 law on credit 
organisations deﬁ  nes several different types of non-banking ﬁ  nancial institution (NBFI) under which 
microﬁ  nance providers can legally operate. Universal Credit Organisations (UCOs), a type of NBFI, 
have the largest share of the microﬁ  nance sector.
l  Laws passed in 2005 and 2007 require a non-proﬁ  t organisation wishing to partake in lending to 
register as a credit organisation by taking on the legal form of a limited liability company (LLC), a joint 
stock company (JSC) or a co-operative, and retaining 100% ownership.
l  Only banks can offer a range of services beyond microcredit. Other MFIs are limited to microlending to 
individuals and groups for business development and consumption. 
l  Governance standards have markedly improved since the passage of the 2005 and 2007 laws on credit 
and ﬁ  nancial institutions. Both laws increased the involvement of the Central Bank of Armenia in 
supervising MFIs. Previously, many were operating as foundations, and as such remained outside the 
scope of ﬁ  nancial supervision. Also, the need for external funding has placed more pressure on MFIs to 
increase transparency and improve reporting standards.
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  Over the course of 2009 regulatory emphasis has been placed on consumer protection, consumer 
rights, and improving guidelines on existing prudential regulations. Armenia is one of the ﬁ  rst 
countries in the region to start working on a comprehensive consumer protection framework, and has 
begun adopting measures to boost transparency. 
l  Recent proposed adjustments to consumer credit regulations aim to introduce the concept of 
calculating interest rates so that they are effective rather than nominal. 
l  Since the passage of a 2008 law, both listed and unlisted companies must report in a manner 
compliant with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). A majority of MFIs follow IFRS 
after a January 2010 deadline that required all NBFIs (including UCOs, which make up much of the 
market) to adopt these standards. 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia © Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
Global microscope on the microﬁ  nance 
business environment 2010
Microﬁ  nance country proﬁ  les
30
Azerbaijan
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l The  microﬁ  nance sector in Azerbaijan has grown rapidly in recent years, but has been hampered until 
recently by a lack of legislation.
l  Foreign non-governmental organisations (NGOs), some of which offer microﬁ  nance services, have 
been subject to increased regulatory harassment in recent years.
l  Banks dominate the microﬁ  nance sector. The largest, Access Bank, held almost 40% of the total 
microcredit loan stock in early 2010.
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  The passage of a new law on non-bank credit institutions (NBCIs) in late 2009 will go a long way 
toward clarifying the legal and regulatory regime for microﬁ  nance.
l  Expansion in the microﬁ  nance sector slowed in 2009 as the market became saturated and microﬁ  nance 
institutions (MFIs) concentrated on portfolio quality and risk management, in light of the global 
ﬁ  nancial crisis.
l  In early 2010 the public credit registry began collecting information from MFIs and providing them 
with access to its database. This is likely to increase loan quality over time, although the credit bureau 
currently covers only 7% of the adult population.
Bosnia
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  The country has a mature microﬁ  nance sector, with high levels of penetration and many players. 
l  The regulatory environment is divided as a result of the different microﬁ  nance regulations in the 
Republika Srpska and Bosnia. Bosnian microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs) are generally classiﬁ  ed as non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). At the same time banks such as ProCredit Bank are very active in 
microﬁ  nance.
l  Supervision is quite strong on paper, but capacity and enforcement do not yet match regulatory 
intent.
l  Some commentators say a substantial share of microﬁ  nance loans in the past were used to ﬁ  nance 
consumption, rather than business development, and over-indebtedness has become a key issue that 
microﬁ  nance institutions must address.
l  Remittances play an important role in servicing existing debts.
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  An increase in portfolio at risk (PAR) is the main issue facing the sector.
l  Obtaining funds is becoming more difﬁ  cult, although liquidity remains at reasonable levels.
l  Growth in new loans has been slowed by the credit crisis, and regulatory oversight has intensiﬁ  ed.
l  MFIs are experiencing a negative return on assets, having previously been among the most proﬁ  table Global microscope on the microﬁ  nance 
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in the region
l  A pilot project is underway in Tuzla, ﬁ  nanced by the British Department for International Development 
(DFID), that seeks to educate people about ﬁ  nancial management and the risks of indebtedness. 
Known as the Client Debt Advice Centre, this new institution could help to mediate between creditors 
and debtors. 
Georgia
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  Georgia’s commercial banking law does not speciﬁ  cally limit microcredit, but provisions on 
uncollateralised lending are generally very stringent. Microﬁ  nance organisations (MFOs) are 
prohibited from accepting deposits. 
l  A law speciﬁ  c to microﬁ  nance was passed in 2006, although it makes no provision for deposit-taking. 
In accordance with the law, organisations can register with the National Bank of Georgia (the central 
bank) to become MFOs. There is no interest rate ceiling, and the maximum amount extended by an 
MFO to one borrower as a microloan cannot exceed Lari50,000 (US$27,000), which is well above the 
average loan size.
l  According to a joint MIX Market-CGAP study, MFOs lend to around half of the total borrowers in the 
Georgian microﬁ  nance market. Specialised microﬁ  nance banks follow MFOs in terms of number of 
borrowers, but have almost triple the loan portfolio. 
l  Supervision by the central bank is adequate and regulators understand the sector well. The central 
bank requires reporting through monthly ﬁ  nancial statements.
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  Growth in microcredit loans expanded at a double-digit pace in 2009. Microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs) 
increased their regional reach and began to move into remote areas. 
l  Georgian regulators continued to mitigate ﬁ  nancial risks in the economy, and MFIs have been 
pressured to increase their loan-loss provisions. 
l  Nonetheless, MFIs accounted for less than 5% of total banking assets in 2009 and are not considered 
a systemic risk. Traditional banks continue to dominate the ﬁ  nancial sector and are the main focus of 
ﬁ  nancial regulation.
l  MFIs are gradually adding new services. Credo, a leading MFO, launched a pilot life insurance product 
and a range of money payment systems throughout 2009. In February 2010 Bank Constanta added a 
fund remittance system to its roster of services.© Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
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Kyrgyz Republic
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  The country is home to a large number of microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs)—more than 350 in 2009—
which suggests a highly competitive environment. However, many of these are small and localised in 
their operations. 
l  The Kyrgyz Republic is considered to be a regional leader in microﬁ  nance regulation. It passed a law on 
MFIs in 2002 that permitted a tiered range of MFIs with varying regulatory and supervisory requirements.
l  In view of the low entry barriers, many small MFIs are poorly managed.
l  The limited number of MFIs that can take deposits restricts their ability to upgrade.
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  As in all countries in the region, credit growth slowed sharply in 2009 in response to the global 
ﬁ  nancial crisis and funding constraints.
l  The total loan portfolio has continued to grow, but there are reports of a reduction in the customer 
base as MFIs concentrate on credit quality to reduce loan losses.
l  Increasing political authoritarianism led to concerns about the independence of the National Bank 
of the Kyrgyz Republic (the central bank), which regulates MFIs. However, after the recent ouster of 
the previous president, the trend towards political authoritarianism may change. Amendments to the 
country’s microﬁ  nance law that had not been signed by the previous president are currently being 
discussed with the new interim government.
l  The entry into the market of a new state-funded MFI—the AUB-AGRO Microcredit Company, which 
plans to lend US$22.5m to the agricultural sector in 2010—may undermine some existing MFIs.
Tajikistan
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  There are around 120 microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs) in Tajikistan, about one-quarter of which can 
take deposits. However, most of them are small and lack the capacity to expand their credit portfolios 
signiﬁ  cantly, which means that demand for microcredit still outweighs supply.
l  Despite the high number of MFIs, the microﬁ  nance market is dominated by banks, with the four largest 
banks holding around 90% of the loan portfolio market share.
l  MFIs have found it difﬁ  cult to secure licences to accept deposits. However, the National Bank of 
Tajikistan (the central bank) is apparently becoming more willing to issue these licences.
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  The total loan portfolio has continued to grow, but there has been a drop in loan quality as remittance 
inﬂ  ows from relatives working in Russia fell during the global recession in 2009. Commentators report 
a drop in the number of customers served, suggesting that MFIs are concentrating on improving credit 
quality.Global microscope on the microﬁ  nance 
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l  A functioning private sector credit bureau is expected to be in place by the end of 2010, following 
passage of legislation a year earlier. 
l  Legislative amendments in 2009 increased disclosure requirements in cases of conﬂ  icts of interest, 
and increased director liability and shareholders rights, which will improve standards of transparency 
within the sector.
Turkey
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l Microﬁ  nance remains under-represented within the ﬁ  nancial sector, with a large number of unserved 
clients, especially in rural areas of Eastern Anatolia.
l  As a middle-income country, Turkey has an advanced banking sector, which reduces the need for 
microﬁ  nance.
l  The percentage of loan recovery is very high. The Turkish Grameen Microcredit Programme (TGMP), one 
of the two largest microﬁ  nance players (the other being Maya Bank), claims loan recovery levels of 
100%. Portfolio-at-risk (PAR) levels are very low.
l  Basic loans are the most common form of microﬁ  nance; these usually start at US$75. 
l  Lending to individual clients dominates; lending to groups  is much less common. 
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  Authorities are now looking at the microﬁ  nance sector more seriously.
l  Several large private banks are launching or are about to launch microcredit products (including HSBC 
and Sekerbank).
l  TGMP has expanded its geographic reach, covering most of Eastern and Central Turkey, including 
cities in the West, such as Bursa. TGMP has 32 branches around the country, with more than 10,000 
customers.
l  Awareness of microﬁ  nance is improving, but remains at a low level.© Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
Global microscope on the microﬁ  nance 
business environment 2010
Microﬁ  nance country proﬁ  les
34
Argentina
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l The  microﬁ  nance sector in Argentina is small. It is composed mainly of second-tier public institutions, 
non-prudentially regulated entities (such as Sociedades Anónimas (SAs) that are associated with 
banks) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
l  Interest rates are not regulated directly, but microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs) must apply 
administratively determined rates when lending government funds. They also face competition from 
subsidised, ﬁ  rst-tier public lending.
l  Sector supervision is weak and the legal and regulatory environment is underdeveloped. As a result, 
standards of accountancy and governance remain poor.
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  The December 2008 Central Bank circular on microﬁ  nance, which allows banks to grant microﬁ  nance 
directly (rather than through SAs), is beginning to have a positive impact on the sector, and banks are 
steadily increasing their presence. 
l  Two co-operatives were created in 2009, the ﬁ  rst to open under a 2007 law pertaining to such ﬁ  nancial 
organisations. Their full market presence and role is still being established.
l  Modest efforts by the Superintendency to begin regulating microﬁ  nance have been impeded by 
continued fragmentation of policy across several government institutions, as well as by the growing 
politicisation of the Banco Central de la República Argentina (the central bank, under which the 
Superintendency lies).
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Bolivia
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  Bolivia maintains a strong and favourable microﬁ  nance regulatory environment, notwithstanding 
the loss of important personnel following the creation of the Autoridad de Supervisión del Sistema 
Financiero (ASFI, Financial System Supervisory Authority), some loss in its autonomy vis-à-vis its 
predecessor agency, and uncertainty about the effects of bringing non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and closed co-operatives under regulation.
l  The depth and range of microﬁ  nance services continues to grow impressively, as market competition 
remains strong.
l  NGOs offer a wide variety of services and practice good governance and transparency, but their 
accounting standards remain below international norms. 
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  The availability of cheap commercial bank on-lending and relative insulation from the international 
ﬁ  nancial crisis have meant improved proﬁ  tability, falling interest rates, and continuing low rates of 
arrears and defaults.
l  The process of upgrading into formal, regulated institutional status for NGOs and closed co-operatives, 
which are now regulated by the ASFI, is underway, with still-uncertain outcomes, timelines, and impacts. 
l  Consumer-protection regulation of fees and commissions continues to be strict, but no formal interest 
rate caps have materialised. Moreover, concessional on-lending has not led to concessional ﬁ  rst-tier 
competition from public entities as had been feared. 
Brazil
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  Although Brazil is making moves in the right direction, it still lacks a speciﬁ  c deﬁ  nition of microcredit 
that would distinguish it from other lending portfolios, and does not have clear upgrading pathways 
for non-regulated institutions. 
l  Most regulated institutions engaged in microﬁ  nance are banks and co-operatives, however few of 
these actually offer microcredit for productive use as this market segment is generally served by non-
regulated institutions.
l  Co-operatives are growing faster than the ﬁ  nancial system as a whole, but a lack of distinction in their 
portfolios between microﬁ  nance, consumer ﬁ  nance, small business lending, and other forms of credit 
makes it difﬁ  cult to know if microcredit is growing.
l  Competition from the state and interest-rate caps for loans that use public funding continue to be 
obstacles.
l  The regulatory capacity of the Banco Central do Brasil (BCB, the central bank) continues to expand 
modestly in terms of staff training and co-ordination, but the required level of microﬁ  nance 
specialisation is still limited. © Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
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Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  The BCB’s supervision of, and the transparency of, co-operative governance were strengthened by an 
April 2009 law that expanded the terms of banks’ ﬁ  scal commissions and gave a ﬁ  scal oversight role to 
co-operative federations for the ﬁ  rst time, including calling member assemblies when problems arise.
l  The federal government has adopted “ﬁ  nancial inclusion” as a strategic priority for the BCB and 
government as a whole, and the level of training in microﬁ  nance and the degree of interdepartmental 
co-ordination among Central Bank ofﬁ  cials with such expertise has grown. These efforts come at a time 
when the current government is emphasising microﬁ  nance in its re-election campaign.
l  Second-tier funding from various ofﬁ  cial sources that passes through the Banco Nacional de 
Desenvolvimiento Econômico e Social (BNDES, the national development bank) and the Labour 
Ministry continues to grow. The Serviço Brasileiro de Apoio às Micro e Pequenas Empresas (SEBRAE, 
the agency that promotes small business), has recently opened a microﬁ  nance department to provide 
second-tier lending.
Chile
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  The banking Superintendency does not treat microﬁ  nance as a separate activity with different rules, 
and does not have signiﬁ  cant specialised knowledge of the sector.
l  While non-governmental organisations enjoy certain ﬁ  scal advantages compared with regulated 
microﬁ  nance institutions and do not face interest rate restrictions, they lack the capital and expertise 
to upgrade to regulated status, and do not have strong incentives to do so. As a result, they mostly 
remain small in size.
l  Governance and accounting standards are above average; transparency has room for improvement.
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  Commercial and state-owned banks are steadily increasing their presence in the microﬁ  nance sector 
through the opening of microﬁ  nance units.
l  A legislative proposal is pending that would allow for publication of disaggregated credit history, by 
both the public and private bureaus.
l  It is not clear that the change of governments and parties will make any signiﬁ  cant difference in 
microﬁ  nance regulation.Global microscope on the microﬁ  nance 
business environment 2010
Microﬁ  nance country proﬁ  les
© Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010 37
Colombia
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l The  microﬁ  nance regulatory framework is still only modestly developed. Interest rates remain strictly 
regulated and microﬁ  nance is still treated like traditional banking in many ways. Technologies and 
methods typically used in consumer-based commercial lending have been applied to microﬁ  nance. 
l  The quality of credit bureaus and governance standards are areas of relative strength, although issues 
of over-indebtedness and client default have been common during the past two years.
l Microﬁ  nance institutions need to improve their accounting standards and levels of transparency.
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  The government has not readjusted the micro-lending interest rate since 2007, despite provisions 
requiring annual review. An adjustment would seem to be overdue, and some microﬁ  nance players ﬁ  nd 
the interest rate (and the usury cap) restrictive.
l  Apparent gains in regulatory capacity for microﬁ  nance have proved ephemeral in the face of 
continuing turnover in leadership and technical staff in the Superintendency. This is reﬂ  ected by a 
failure to ensure that institutions are genuinely conducting microcredit, and that they apply best 
practice (such as home visits to assess creditworthiness and repayment).
l  Banks and other ﬁ  nancial services players continue to establish microﬁ  nance units, and some non-
governmental organisations seek to upgrade to ﬁ  nance companies.
Costa Rica
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  Although there are no meaningful interest rate restrictions, ﬁ  rst-tier state programmes offer 
subsidised competition for microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs).
l  Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) tend to be small and undercapitalised (except the two 
largest), and they lack access to international assistance.
l  NGOs lack suitable public second-tier funding (although talks are currently underway that would allow 
greater access to funds as the 2008 Development Banking Law is implemented). Furthermore, NGOs 
are subject to the same taxes as regulated institutions.
l  Accounting, governance, and transparency standards are reasonably well developed and observed.
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l Low  microﬁ  nance default rates have led some banks recently to downscale and expand their market 
presence.
l  Credit bureau coverage, for both private bureaus and the public registry, continues to grow, although 
the quality of information remains uneven.
l  Although the 2008 Development Banking Law gives the Superintendency the authority to supervise 
and regulate microﬁ  nance, it has so far shown little interest in exercising these powers. © Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
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Dominican Republic
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  The lack of a speciﬁ  c, comprehensive regulatory framework for microﬁ  nance continues to be an 
obstacle.
l  The quality of general ﬁ  nancial supervision and oversight continues to be better than for microﬁ  nance 
speciﬁ  cally.
l  Institutional development, as measured by governance, accounting, and transparency, is uneven, 
particularly between regulated and non-regulated institutions.
l  The quality and coverage of credit information for microﬁ  nance transactions is one of the country’s 
strengths.
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  A new company law has improved corporate governance, with apparent, but still unconﬁ  rmed, beneﬁ  ts 
for regulated microﬁ  nance.
l  A December 2008 law—still  awaiting implementation as of June 2010—would require 90% of 
microﬁ  nance lending by the Consejo Nacional de Promoción y Apoyo a la Micro, Pequeña y Mediana 
Empresa (PROMIPYME, a public institution that engages in non-collateralised, unregulated lending 
to “microenterprises” and “subsistence microenterprises”) to be ﬁ  rst-tier in nature. This could 
strain the institution’s capacity, and if sole representation on its governing council is given to the 
Council of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, could exclude and negatively impact the activities of 
unregulated institutions.
l  Competition continues to be distorted through government subsidies for ﬁ  rst-tier lending, the use of 
political criteria in ﬁ  rst- and second-tier loans, and caps on interest rates for on-lending. 
l  Commercial banks have begun moving more aggressively into microcredit, increasingly competing 
with established regulated and non-regulated microﬁ  nance institutions.
Ecuador
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  The constitution of 2008 mandates the formation of separate superintendencies for the public, 
private, and “social” ﬁ  nancial systems, but until such time as implementing regulations are 
enacted, the previous system, with its single superintendency, remains in force, creating regulatory 
uncertainty.
l  Interest rate restrictions have been tightened in recent years, with commissions outlawed and caps 
set that pose a signiﬁ  cant obstacle to microﬁ  nance institutions in terms of covering operating costs. 
Several public programmes with high subsidies and non-market social criteria distort competition by 
re-shaping borrower expectations.
l A  signiﬁ  cant number of specialised microﬁ  nance institutions continue to exist among all the major 
formal categories (that is, banks, ﬁ  nance companies, credit unions).Global microscope on the microﬁ  nance 
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Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  Non-governmental organisations face problems in terms of scale and capitalisation. There are also 
increasing difﬁ  culties in competing with banks and regulated institutions, as well as with public ﬁ  rst-
tier lenders, especially under current interest rate restrictions. The tax burden has also increased since 
2009. 
l  A decline in the size of microﬁ  nance portfolios and in the rates of ﬁ  nancial inclusion are evident; co-
operatives are the fastest-growing segment of a shrinking overall market.
l  Under a new co-operatives law passed in late 2009, any co-operative that takes deposits, whatever 
its size, is considered to practise ﬁ  nancial intermediation, and therefore is subject to prudential 
regulation. (Around 50 are currently in this category). The law does not, however, treat them exactly 
the same as banks, increasing their ability to operate in more leveraged fashion. Co-operatives not 
taking deposits remain supervised, but not prudentially regulated, by the Ministry of Social Welfare.
El Salvador
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  While supervisory and examination capacity are moderate, the absence of negative government 
interference has facilitated a fairly dynamic microﬁ  nance sector.
l  Credit bureau coverage of micro-lending transactions is a relative strength.
l  Accounting, governance, and transparency standards of microﬁ  nance institutions remain modest.
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  Private credit bureau coverage continues to expand and has become near-universal, yet the quality 
and sharing of data remain problematic.
l  Broadly, there were no major changes in regulations (despite a new superintendent) and few changes 
in the microﬁ  nance business environment.
l  There are now three private credit bureaus, one of which is specialised in microﬁ  nance, a second 
that has expanded into that area and a third, newly created one. They provide both positive and 
negative information, although information-sharing across the divide of regulated and non-regulated 
institutions is not good. There is also a public registry operated by the Superintendency, although 
it tends not to cover transactions by and with small and micro-businesses, and non-regulated 
institutions do not have access to it.© Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
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Guatemala
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  The regulatory framework remains limited and static, given the failure to pass a new microﬁ  nance 
law that has been under discussion for most of the past decade. Regulatory capacity and interest in 
microﬁ  nance on the part of the Superintendency is limited.
l  Commercial banks continue to expand aggressively into microﬁ  nance. Some non-governmental 
organisation-microﬁ  nance institutions (NGO-MFIs) have grown, while others have seen their 
portfolios shrink.
l  Although transparency standards remain fair, accounting and governance are weak.
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  Banrural, a minority state-owned bank, has an important market presence. There is a widely held view 
among competitors that the bank beneﬁ  ts from subsidies, although strong evidence to support this 
is lacking, in part owing to low transparency surrounding its operations and the economy of scale 
beneﬁ  ts that it enjoys. This makes it difﬁ  cult to assess the stand-alone proﬁ  tability of its microﬁ  nance 
operations. 
l  NGOs’ tax liabilities and access to second-tier funding have been especially problematic. Some 
stakeholders believe NGOs face signiﬁ  cant restrictions when offering microﬁ  nance.
l  Credit bureau coverage and the quality of information continue to improve, although the country’s 
performance is still only modest in this area, given the weak integration of data across bureaus and the 
lack of effective regulation of credit bureaus.
Haiti
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l Microﬁ  nance regulation is weak, and specialised supervisory capacity sorely lacking. However, 
the government does not interfere with interest rate setting or sponsor ﬁ  rst-tier programmes that 
compete with microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs).
l  Accounting practices remain distant from international standards and governance standards are poor. 
Transparency is rated average.
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  MFI networks estimate that their member institutions’ portfolios have been put at risk by the recent 
earthquake. The human and ﬁ  nancial toll on MFI clients, and on MFIs themselves, has been huge.
l  One focus of reconstruction efforts is establishing a guarantee fund that—in the words of the 
government’s March 2010 Action Plan—would enable banks to lend for “productive investments and 
not to guarantee or write off doubtful credit as a result of the earthquake or other economic dangers”.
l  The role of microﬁ  nance in recovery is addressed in four points proposed by the government: a 
guarantee fund; grants; recapitalisation of MFIs; and insurance for long-term risks to MFIs from Global microscope on the microﬁ  nance 
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natural disasters and other shocks. How these priorities are addressed, and what level of funding 
commitments they receive from donors, will be decisive in determining the recovery role of MFIs and 
the sustainability of these institutions. 
Honduras
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  The regulatory framework for microﬁ  nance is partially developed, and includes a deﬁ  nition of the 
activity and one type of specialised institution. Pathways to upgrade into specialised or regulated 
institutional forms are still underdeveloped.
l  There is a fairly broad range of institutional types in the microﬁ  nance sector, both among regulated 
institutions and across the regulated/non-regulated divide.
l  There is ample room for improvement in the governance, accounting, and transparency standards of 
microﬁ  nance institutions.
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  In the context of a change of government and a contested interim government, there were few major 
changes in microﬁ  nance regulation.
l  A manual for microﬁ  nance supervision was prepared under the previous government, and could 
be a step forward. But turnover among technical staff following the recent political conﬂ  ict makes 
implementation uncertain.
l  Organismos Privados de Desarrollo Financiero (OPDFs, private ﬁ  nancial development organisations) 
are non-bank ﬁ  nancial institutions that were created as regulated microﬁ  nance vehicles, particularly 
intended for upscaling non-governmental organisations. Not as many have been created as was 
initially hoped, however. As of November 2009 there were ﬁ  ve OPDFs, three of which began operations 
in 2008.
Jamaica
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  There is no clear microﬁ  nance regulatory framework. The Bank of Jamaica (the central bank) has little 
supervisory capacity, and very few institutions operate in the sector.
l  A small number of non-regulated non-governmental organisations comprise the bulk of the sector, 
along with credit unions, which have only recently come under regulatory scrutiny.
l  Standards of transparency and governance among institutions active in microﬁ  nance are poor.
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l Jamaica’s  ﬁ  rst regulated credit unions will reportedly begin operation by the third quarter of 2010, 
although enabling legislation is still not in place.© Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
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l Improved  ﬁ  nancial sector supervision has strengthened oversight of regulated institutions that offer 
ﬁ  nancial services on a more general level. A supervisory framework for credit unions is still being 
established and is expected to be more fully in place by late 2010.
l  A private credit bureau has been in the process of forming since 2006. Operations are expected to 
begin by mid-2010.
Mexico
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  Supervisory and examination capacity remain limited for microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs). Despite 
recent legislation targeting savings and credit organisations, Mexico still lacks clearly deﬁ  ned 
microﬁ  nance regulation. 
l  Transparency remains an issue, and the federal government lacks the capacity to enforce 
accountability measures. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are self-regulating and follow 
various standards. 
l  Like banks, savings and loan co-operatives and Sociedades Financieras Populares (SOFIPOS, for-proﬁ  t 
popular ﬁ  nancial partnerships) are allowed to accept deposits. Non-regulated institutions, such as 
NGOs, cannot capture savings in any form.
l  There is a private credit bureau that works with larger MFIs; smaller MFIs rely on their own joint 
bureau, Círculo de Crédito. Many MFIs are reluctant to report information on their clients and such 
reporting is not legally required, although second-tier funders make it a condition of on-lending. The 
quality of credit information is much better in central than in southern Mexico (the two regions where 
MFIs operate most frequently).
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  A 2009 modiﬁ  cation of a law on savings and credit aimed to create separate regulatory standards and 
guidelines for co-operatives and SOFIPOS. About 800 co-operatives submitted the required paperwork 
by the February 2010 deadline. Speciﬁ  c reforms and further deadlines were not deﬁ  ned for however, 
leaving them in a regulatory limbo.
l  A 2006 decree required that Sociedades Financieras de Objeto Limitado (SOFOLEs, ﬁ  nancial companies 
with limited corporate purposes) be converted to Sociedades Financieras con Objetos Múltiples 
(SOFOMEs, ﬁ  nancial companies with multiple corporate purposes that can either be regulated or 
unregulated) by 2013. Credit unions and leasing companies have also been converting to SOFOME 
status. 
l  In addition to its requirements on co-operatives and SOFIPOS, new legislation in 2009 introduced 
two new institutional forms, Sociedades Financieras Comunitarias (SOFINCO, community ﬁ  nance 
companies) and Organismos de Integración Financiera Rural (OIFR, Rural Financial Integration 
Institutions). These are intended to promote, respectively, the integration of existing rural institution 
operations and the provision of ﬁ  nancial services. Global microscope on the microﬁ  nance 
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Nicaragua
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l Microﬁ  nance institutions have expanded rapidly in Nicaragua in recent years. The lack of interest 
from the main banks in ﬁ  nancing small producers has created a large, unmet demand for rural credit 
facilities.
l  The absence of an adequate legal framework for microﬁ  nance continues to make it difﬁ  cult for the 
industry to ﬂ  ourish, as most institutions remain unregulated.
l  A powerful debtors’ movement called the Movimiento No Pago (the Non-Payment Movement) has 
garnered strong political support in the executive branch and in the legislature, re-shaping both 
public policy and the attitudes of borrowers in ways that undermine microﬁ  nance. A resulting 
debt moratorium will now drastically reduce the extension of credit to new clients as microﬁ  nance 
institutions see their portfolio risk rise and their funding (which is mainly external) suspended or 
withheld.
l The  microﬁ  nance sector is competitive but highly fragmented, with a limited range of available 
services. Transparency and accounting standards are reasonably good, but governance standards are 
poor.
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  The new moratorium law for microﬁ  nance debtors further threatens an already reeling microﬁ  nance 
sector—particularly its non-regulated non-governmental organisation (NGO) segment—given 
artiﬁ  cially low caps on restructuring agreements. The moratorium also creates a moral-hazard effect 
on the larger borrowing community.
l  Hopes for revisions in the existing microﬁ  nance law have been dashed in the wake of economic crisis 
and the debtors’ movement. Also dashed are the hopes of NGOs that they would obtain a clear path to 
becoming regulated ﬁ  nancial institutions capable of capturing deposits. 
l  NGOs are particularly affected by the decline in international funding that began in 2009 and 
continues in 2010, owing to the debt moratorium. Between US$60m and US$90m of international 
funding lines were not renewed last year, and another US$70m was at risk as of June 2010.
l  Serious governance problems have come to light in some non-regulated microﬁ  nance institutions, 
and the sector in general has suffered under the weight of mounting arrears and defaults.
l  Along with other micro-ﬁ  nance lenders, a commercial bank specialising in micro-lending, Banco 
del Exito (Banex), has been undermined by a combination of the global economic downturn and the 
impact of the Movimiento No Pago. In late May the institution announced that a group of international 
creditors had agreed to accept shares in the bank in lieu of repayment of outstanding loans, as Banex 
owed a total of US$85m to 28 different creditors in March. The proportion of its loans that had fallen 
into arrears reached 25% of its total portfolio. © Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
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Panama
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  Panama lacks a compelling regulatory framework for microﬁ  nance, although the country has made 
some progress recently toward promoting microenterprise via banks and second-tier lending. 
l  The Superintendencia del Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas (the Superintendency of the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance) lacks speciﬁ  c procedures and clear deﬁ  nitions for microﬁ  nance. Microﬁ  nance 
institutions (MFIs) for the most part are treated the same as all other regulated ﬁ  nancial institutions.
l  A banking licence speciﬁ  c to microﬁ  nance would allow MFIs to upgrade to so-called special bank 
status, with lower minimum capital requirements. However, the documentation and requirements to 
upgrade are costly and burdensome; only a few MFIs operate in the sector and offer a limited range of 
products.
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  Funding for microﬁ  nance institutions through second-tier government support is set to increase 
owing to a 2009 law and a 2008 decree. The latter seems to have led some commercial banks to venture 
into the sector, but only on a limited scale.
l  The government now considers micro- and small-enterprises as banking clients if they receive credits 
for commercial purposes up to US$200,000. This has opened a window for banks to give microloans.
l  A long-established private credit bureau provides accurate, updated information that is both positive 
and negative, and at low cost. A uniform credit scoring system has been rolled out over the past year, 
and the bureau is used widely by a range of Panamanian institutions active in microﬁ  nance (banks, 
ﬁ  nance companies, co-operatives, and non-governmental organisations). 
Paraguay
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l Non-regulated  microﬁ  nance institutions do not face restrictive interest rate caps or signiﬁ  cant 
competition from subsidised ﬁ  rst-tier government lending.
l  While accounting requirements are stricter for regulated MFIs than for unregulated ones, practices 
among both types of providers vary widely and generally fall short of international standards. 
Governance and transparency standards and practices are modest at best. 
l  The quality of information at credit bureaus continues to be a concern; it is neither well consolidated 
nor very detailed.
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  Pathways to upgrade from a non-governmental organisation or credit co-operative to a ﬁ  nance 
company, and from a ﬁ  nance company to a bank, have become better deﬁ  ned. In recent years, it has 
become more common for ﬁ  nance companies to upgrade to bank status. 
l  As of June 2010 two institutions were in the process of upgrading their operations. These moves Global microscope on the microﬁ  nance 
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reﬂ  ect efforts by the Banking Superintendency to modify existing rules with the support of the Banco 
Central de Paraguay (the central bank).
l  Separate pieces of legislation that would restrict the activities of credit bureaus and strengthen the 
rights of debtors are pending and may pose problems going forward.
Peru
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  The Superintendency of Banking, Insurance, and Pension Funds (SBS) is the principal regulator for the 
sector and enjoys a good reputation for the quality of its supervisory capacity. Regulations are in place 
for microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs), such as loan-loss provisioning based on loan status (rather than 
institution type); increasingly thorough on-site inspection procedures; and stringent requirements for 
internal controls. 
l  Subsidised public retail ﬁ  nancial institutions offer no direct competition, except the Cajas 
Municipales de Ahorro y Crédito (CMACs, municipal savings and loan banks, which operate according 
to market criteria). Under the current government, some institutions, such as Agrobanco, have 
offered concessional loan terms and interest rates, but these do not appear to have any signiﬁ  cant 
distortionary impact. 
l  Entidades de Desarrollo para la Pequeña y Microempresa (EDPYMEs) were created as a specialised 
vehicle for microﬁ  nance and are regulated by the SBS. These non-deposit-taking institutions are 
often owned by non-governmental organisations (NGOs); the difﬁ  culty in raising capital, particularly 
through deposit-taking, has been the one weakness of this otherwise potent MFI vehicle. Upgrading to 
a ﬁ  nance company can allow institutions to offer a greater range of deposit-taking services and access 
capital markets more easily, although these institutions still fall short of being able to offer checking 
accounts, which is reserved for banks. 
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  The most notable changes to microﬁ  nance regulations in Peru occurred in 2008, when a June 2008 
decree expanded the services of EDPYMEs by allowing them (along with CMACs and CRACs) greater 
access to capital markets. A few now offer insurance or fund transfers, although most remain limited to 
credit services. 
l  The June 2008 decree also outlines which activities EDPYMEs, CMACs, and Cajas Rurales de Ahorro y 
Crédito (CRACs, rural savings and loan banks) may undertake as a matter of course. Also, CMACs, which 
are constituted at the municipal level, can now operate in other departments and provinces. These 
changes reﬂ  ect a high level of regulatory capacity and ﬂ  exibility.
l  As a result of the economic slowdown, banks’ lending portfolios have deteriorated, despite low 
levels of non-performing loans. Nonetheless, banks are wary of lending to small and medium-sized 
enterprises and will continue to remain cautious until they build up their capacity to assess credit 
risks.© Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
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Trinidad and Tobago
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  The country lacks a regulatory framework for microﬁ  nance, nor does it beneﬁ  t from a superintendency 
with sector-speciﬁ  c supervisory and examination capacity.
l  There are very few institutions engaged in microcredit, and virtually none engage in classic, non-
collateralised microcredit.
l  Institutions operating in microﬁ  nance suffer from signiﬁ  cant deﬁ  ciencies in accounting, transparency 
and, above all, governance standards.
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  The implementation of regulations that would determine the conditions under which credit unions will 
become regulated entities is expected by the third quarter of 2010. However, it is doubtful that the 
newly regulated credit unions will be allowed to engage formally in microcredit.
l  Reverberations from the 2009 collapse of the nation’s largest ﬁ  nancial conglomerate, CL Financial, 
have exposed serious weaknesses in ﬁ  nancial regulation and corporate governance in the broader 
economy. 
l  In particular, the CL Financial debacle exposed weaknesses in the country’s ﬁ  nancial reporting 
standards. International accounting ﬁ  rms have also reported difﬁ  culties when trying to evaluate the 
ﬁ  nances of audited entities. 
Uruguay
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  The majority of microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs) in the country are non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), non-regulated co-operatives, or non-prudentially-regulated Sociedades Anónimas (SAs, non-
bank ﬁ  nancial institutions). 
l  Caps on interest rates for micro- and small-enterprise lending as a result of the country’s usury law 
create distortions. First, the limits are calculated based on the average interest rate of the formally 
regulated ﬁ  nancial system, which includes the interest rates of the Banco de la República Oriental del 
Uruguay (BROU), a public bank. Moreover, interest rates for consumption loans are higher than those 
for productive loans, creating an incentive system that favours consumer lending over loans to micro-
enterprises.
l  It is virtually impossible for NGOs to accumulate capital and a large enough client base to upgrade into 
an SA, although making the transition would provide NGOs with greater access to capital markets. 
Only a few have taken this route, but most have a strong social orientation and are not interested in 
becoming for-proﬁ  t institutions. 
l  Uruguay’s public registry remains effectively closed to non-regulated institutions. Since most MFIs 
are non-regulated (except for SAs with regulated parent banks), this means much of the microﬁ  nance 
sector lacks credit bureau access. Global microscope on the microﬁ  nance 
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Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  In 2008 the BROU announced the creation of República Microﬁ  nanzas, a separate non-bank entity 
specialising in microﬁ  nance. Competing MFIs are concerned that República Microﬁ  nanzas, once it 
is operational, will crowd out the market through subsidised interest rates, though so far it seems 
inclined to keep interest rates at market levels.
l  Through an initiative  called Programa de Microﬁ  nanzas para el Desarrollo Productivo (the Program for 
Productive Development through Microﬁ  nance), the Banco Central de Uruguay (the central bank) is 
revisiting provisions that limit interest rates under the usury law and the deﬁ  nition of microcredit.
l  SAs formally report to the Auditoria Interna de la Nación (AIN, the National Internal Comptroller), 
which is part of the Ministry of Education and Culture. The AIN has recently strengthened its oversight 
and enforcement activities for non-regulated co-operatives and NGOs.
Venezuela
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  Government distortion of the competitive environment through interest rate restrictions and 
subsidised public institutions continues.
l Microﬁ  nance suffers amid a deteriorating overall macroeconomic and regulatory environment that 
affects ﬁ  nance in general. This includes increases in arrears; declines in government consumption 
subsidies that hurt the poor; bank nationalisations and seizures; and moves to extend state control 
over the banking system and the bank regulator.
l  There is no clear deﬁ  nition of microﬁ  nance, nor are there speciﬁ  c supervision and risk-management 
provisions that would permit a distinction between microﬁ  nance, consumption, and small business 
lending.
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l Some  microﬁ  nance-oriented banks have gone out of business or been taken over by the state in the 
past year. In 2009 the government took over Banco Santander’s Venezuelan operations, although the 
microﬁ  nance unit remains in private hands. 
l  There are regulatory and legislative moves afoot to create a super agency to control the banking 
system, threatening the Superintendency of Bank’s precarious independence from the national 
treasury. Interest rate restrictions have also been tightened.
l  The withholding tax on development banks (which in theory specialise in microﬁ  nance) was removed. 
l The  ofﬁ  cial credit registry may be reactivated; if this happens, it would represent a positive step 
forward for the sector.© Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010




The price of microﬁ  nance in Latin America and the Caribbean
Interest rates are a highly debated topic in microﬁ  nance. Discussions centre on what is considered “fair” 
to charge microﬁ  nance clients and to what extent microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs) should set rates 
according to operational sustainability and proﬁ  tability needs. Determining a reasonable or sustainable 
interest rate is also strongly inﬂ  uenced by a country’s broader ﬁ  nancing conditions and characteristics 
(for example population density and the availability of cheap technology, which inﬂ  uence sector lending 
costs). Comparing what MFIs charge in one country with another can bring clarity to the discussion, but 
comprehensive and comparable cross-country data on interest rates is sparse. To close this gap, the 
Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF), a member of the Inter-American Development Bank Group (IDB), 
assembles a dataset on the cost of microﬁ  nance loans and commercial bank loans in each country each 
year. Since data on interest rates are not directly available, MIF calculates the gross portfolio yield for 
MFIs and banks as a proxy for the implied, average interest rate charged on the loans. The calculated 
difference between a country’s gross microcredit portfolio yield (the microﬁ  nance ratio) and gross bank 
portfolio yield (the bank ratio) offers a microﬁ  nance premium indicator that can be compared across 
countries. The microﬁ  nance premium for 18 Latin American and Caribbean countries, as well as the 
microﬁ  nance and bank ratios of individual countries, are presented in the table below. © Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010 49
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Nominal ﬁ  nancial revenues/Average loan portfolio (as a proxy for interest rates)1
(Selected countries circa 20092)
Country Microﬁ  nance  Bank  Microﬁ  nance
 ratio  ratio  premium 
 (a)  (b)  (a)-(b)
 Argentina   60.8  18.6  42.3
 Bolivia   20.2  14.9  5.3
 Brazil   23.7  15.6  8.1
 Chile   32.1   6.4  25.7 
 Colombia   30.7  12.4  18.3
 Dominican Republic   33.1   19.0  14.1 
 Ecuador   20.4  12.8  7.6
 El Salvador   22.9  11.1  11.8
 Guatemala   25.3  17.3  8.0
 Haiti   51.3  n.a.  n.a.
 Honduras   32.2  18.9  13.3
 Mexico   74.2  21.0  53.2
 Nicaragua   25.9  18.8  7.1
 Panama   31.1  8.5  22.6 
 Paraguay   25.6  16.8  8.8 
 Peru   29.1  15.1  14.0
 Uruguay   41.1  16.8  24.3
 Venezuela   24.4  19.6  4.8
Regional weighted average3  28.6  
Sources: MFI data were collected from MIX Market, microﬁ  nance networks, regulators, interviews and data questionnaires, and web sites. Data for MFIs 
include both regulated and non-regulated institutions. 
Bank data includes 375 banks. Data were collected from banking associations afﬁ  liated with the Latin American Banking Federation (FELABAN), the 
FELABAN Financial Bulletin, the central bank of Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay, the Superintendency of Banks of the Dominican Republic and the 
Superintendency of Banks of Panama. 
(1) Ratios are weighted by total loan portfolio.
(2) Data are for December 2009. Where 2009 data were not available, December 2008 data have been used.
(3) This calculation includes all available data from MFIs whose microcredit portfolio represents more than 30% of their total loan portfolio 
(349 institutions).
Additional information and data updates can be found at www.iadb.org/micamericas.
This article was prepared by MIF.© Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
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Middle East and North Africa
Lebanon
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l Microﬁ  nance is lightly regulated in Lebanon. All but one of the microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs) 
operate as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and have freedom to set the terms and interest 
rates on their loans, although they are not able to take deposits.
l  The mainstream MFI sector is dominated by two organisations that each have portfolios of around 
US$10m: Ameen, which is registered as a ﬁ  nancial services company, and Al Majmoua, which is an 
NGO.
l  Many other MFIs are extensions of political/sectarian movements, focusing their efforts on their 
particular communities, and do not operate on a commercial basis.
l  Lebanon is a regional centre for banking, and its local banks provide a wide range of services that are 
broadly accessible, reducing the need for some aspects of microﬁ  nance, such as deposit-taking. The 
major mainstream MFIs partner with a number of local banks, which help process the disbursement 
and repayment of loans.
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  Lebanon was in a state of paralysis for much of 2009. The parliament that was elected in June was 
not able to form a functioning government until November, and the new cabinet did not meet until 
March 2010. This meant that no legislation was developed over the last year, and many ministries 
were unable to develop new initiatives. It is, therefore, unsurprising that there were no ofﬁ  cial 
developments in the microﬁ  nance sector. 
l  Although the Banque du Liban (the central bank) is independent and largely insulated from Lebanon’s 
turbulent politics, it has not issued any new regulations or circulars regarding microﬁ  nance.
l  The public credit registry is growing gradually, and now covers 8.3% of the adult population, up from 
6.8% in 2009.
l  A new MFI, Emkan, has begun operations with a large capital base and offers interest rates subsidised 
by the Hariri Foundation, a charity associated with the prime minister, Saad Hariri. This has served to 
distort further the market for those MFIs that offer loans on commercial or cost-recovery terms.Global microscope on the microﬁ  nance 
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Morocco
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  The sector is dominated by a few large microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs), and this market concentration 
has increased over the last year.
l  Microcredit is the only ﬁ  nancial service currently offered by MFIs. 
l  There has been considerable growth recently in non-performing loans (NPLs) as MFIs have expanded 
and engaged in excessive cross-lending. This is a signiﬁ  cant threat to the sector’s sustainability, 
although it will be mitigated by the new credit bureau. 
l  The major MFIs (representing over 90% of the market) comply with good governance and accounting 
practices and are fairly transparent. 
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  The Ministry of Finance is currently discussing ways of transforming MFIs from non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) into commercial, legal entities. This would allow formal ﬁ  nancial institutions to 
enter the market through direct afﬁ  liates, which would beneﬁ  t from interest rate cap exemptions. It 
might also allow institutions to offer deposits to microﬁ  nance clients.
l  In 2009, Zakoura, the second-largest MFI, faced major difﬁ  culties arising from its high-risk portfolio 
and was absorbed by FBP, previously the third-largest MFI.
l  The overall number of borrowers fell in 2009, for the second consecutive year, owing largely to the 
growth in NPLs. MFIs have also been exchanging information about those with poor payment records, 
which has halved the number of common borrowers.
l  A new credit bureau is now operational, and although MFIs reportedly submit information to the 
bureau, transaction costs and other operational issues are still being addressed. According to one 
commentator, the transaction cost was set at Dh5 (60 US cents), as opposed to Dh0.5-1, as had been 
anticipated by MFIs. 
Yemen
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  Only 7% of Yemenis have a bank account. The latent demand for accessible ﬁ  nancial services would 
seem to make the country an ideal market for microﬁ  nance.  
l  The Social Fund for Development (SFD), an ostensibly independent body that relies on foreign donor 
aid, has historically led efforts to promote microﬁ  nance in the country, with assistance from the World 
Bank and the UNDP. 
l  In 2009 the Central Bank of Yemen introduced the Microﬁ  nance Law, which is intended to provide a 
clear set of rules for regulated and formalised microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs).
l The  ﬁ  rst MFI to be licensed under the new law is Al-Amal, which has expanded quickly since its 
inception. © Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
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Key changes and impacts since last year
l The  Microﬁ  nance Law is now fully implemented, with a dedicated and trained team operating within 
the Central Bank of Yemen. 
l  Al Kuraimi, a large exchange and money transfer company with branches and agents across the 
country, has applied for a licence under the Microﬁ  nance Law.
l  A new electronic regulatory system has been introduced, which will allow both the banks and the 
Central Bank to better keep track of their loans.
l  The security situation, which has deteriorated as a result of a series of internal conﬂ  icts, has delayed 
plans to merge the Aden and Abyan MFIs, since the SFD has struggled to ﬁ  nd a consultant willing to 
work in the area.Global microscope on the microﬁ  nance 
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Cameroon
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  The sector is fairly concentrated, with CamCCUL holding the largest share of the total loan portfolio. 
However, a handful of other institutions also represent between 7% and 15% of the total loan 
portfolio, and new market entrants (such as EB-ACCION) may help increase market dynamism. 
l  A law on microﬁ  nance was passed in 2005, and was amended with further prudential requirements in 
2007. However, supervision is still weak owing to a lack of capacity.
l Most  microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs) fail to comply with reporting requirements of the Commission 
Bancaire de l’Afrique Centrale (COBAC, the Central African Banking Commission), a regional body 
that accredits MFIs. Few are familiar with prudential ratios or operating norms introduced by the 
microﬁ  nance law, and electronic reporting requirements are not enforced.
l  The sector is seriously jeopardised by a lack of transparency and the absence of a credit bureau or any 
process for exchanging information on those with poor payment records. 
Key changes and impacts:
l  The launch of a comprehensive microﬁ  nance accounting framework by COBAC was delayed beyond the 
planned date of June 2010. Most MFIs will need time, extensive training and capacity-building to fully 
comply with the new accounting rules. 
l  COBAC has been discussing ways to hand over supervision of small MFIs to local divisions within 
ﬁ  nance ministries in the six member countries in the Central African region.
l  Some MFIs have met to discuss creating a private credit bureau to exchange borrower information. 
Democratic Republic of Congo
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  The Banque Centrale du Congo (the central bank) regulates the ﬁ  nancial sector, including 
microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs), under a 2002 law and a 2005 guidance directive. However, key MFI-
related legislation is pending, and a number of MFIs are waiting for the approval of operating licences.
l Microﬁ  nance services are concentrated in urban areas, with little provision in remote rural locations.
Sub-Saharan Africa © Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
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l  Co-operative and mutual organisations dominate the provision of microﬁ  nance, but there are a few 
large players, particularly ProCredit.
l  The country is still re-establishing itself after a civil war that ended in 2003, and the skills needed to 
develop the microﬁ  nance sector are only being developed gradually.
l  There is a need to improve accounting practice, governance, credit referencing and independent 
ratings of MFIs.
Key changes and impacts since last year
l  Sixteen new microﬁ  nance programmes have been approved in the last year and nine more are subject 
to further approval.
l  Two new laws are planned and being debated in parliament: one to regulate governance and 
accounting practice in MFIs, the other to enable mobile banking (m-banking) services.
l  One of the largest MFIs, FINCA, has received approval to become a non-bank ﬁ  nancial institution 
(NBFI), enabling it to take deposits.
Ghana
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l The  microﬁ  nance sector in Ghana is vibrant and active, offering an increasing range of services. It 
developed, however, in an ad hoc way and is highly decentralised. 
l  While the sector is currently self-regulated quite effectively, the apex bodies—the Cooperative Credit 
Unions Association (CUA), the Co-operative Susu Collector’s Association (GCSCA), the Association of 
Financial Non-governmental Organisations (ASSFIN) and the Co-operative Council (GCC)—are not well 
co-ordinated.
l  The Bank of Ghana (the central bank) does not have the resources to supervise the entire sector, 
although it is directing substantial resources toward strengthening its regulatory capabilities.
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  The 2008 Non-Banking Financial Institutions Act 774 (NBFI Act) has begun to be implemented. It 
regulates all microﬁ  nance activities and is intended to improve co-ordination in the sector. 
l  The new law expands the range of activities allowed to microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs) to encourage 
innovation and development. It is too early to know how the sector will react, but positive changes are 
expected.
l  The global ﬁ  nancial crisis created a liquidity crunch for microﬁ  nance operators and revealed problems 
with capital adequacy, which prompted the central bank to increase dramatically the minimum capital 
requirements. 
l  There has been discussion about regulating the informal savings services provided by “Susu 
Companies”, which sometimes lack the capacity to manage the deposits they take in. This sector has, 
however, been tolerated and unregulated for decades.
l  Under the 2008 NBFI Act, all non-deposit-taking ﬁ  nancial institutions must have GH¢1m Global microscope on the microﬁ  nance 
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(US$688,000) as minimum capital instead of the previous GH¢150,000 and GH¢4m for deposit-taking 
from 2011, and GH¢7m from 2012 (up from GH¢1.5m). The new minimum capital requirements have 
led to a round of consolidation discussions among MFIs, as many of them are under the minimum.
Kenya
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  There is a strong regulatory environment for deposit-taking microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs). 
However, most MFIs are still working to establish the required operational systems and controls and 
comply with ownership and capital requirements established by the 2008 Microﬁ  nance Regulations. As 
of June 2010 only two MFIs had successfully qualiﬁ  ed to become regulated deposit-taking institutions. 
The hundreds of smaller non-deposit-taking MFIs are not regulated or supervised under speciﬁ  c 
microﬁ  nance laws.
l The  ﬁ  nancial sector and the microﬁ  nance environment are concentrated. There is,  however a robust 
and steadily improving business environment, owing in part to the efforts of non-governmental 
organisation (NGO)-MFIs to comply with Microﬁ  nance Regulations (2008) and convert into deposit-
taking microﬁ  nance institution (DTMs). 
l  Kenya continues to be a global leader in mobile banking (m-banking) thanks to the innovative M-PESA 
service, close co-ordination with regulators,  good customer service and provider transparency. All 
major Kenyan mobile operators are now working to establish mobile banking platforms. 
l  Innovation around new delivery channels and especially mobile payments are ongoing in the 
microﬁ  nance sector. 
Key changes and impacts since last year
l  The Central Bank of Kenya licensed the ﬁ  rst credit bureau in early 2010 and now requires all Kenyan 
banks to submit customer information to it. Consequently, two commercial banks with micro-lending 
operations will report to the bureau. MFIs are not yet required to submit client information, but their 
participation likely will be mandated during 2011.
l The  ﬁ  rst DTM was licensed under the Microﬁ  nance Act in May 2009 and the Kenya Women’s Financial 
Trust (KWFT) received a licence in April 2010. Other MFIs are in the process of obtaining a DTM licence, 
though it is unclear how long the process will take.
l  As in other African countries, the microﬁ  nance sector suffers from a lack of transparency on the all-in 
cost of credit. Microﬁ  nance interest rates are often quoted by the month, rather than annually, and 
frequently include additional fees that mask the true and full cost of credit. On a positive note, Kenya 
was the ﬁ  rst African country to participate in MF Transparency’s country survey in 2009. Pricing data 
was collected from 21 MFIs and the total APR was found to range from 10% to 73%.
l  The savings and credit co-operatives (SACCOs) segment has experienced rapid growth. The 
corresponding increase in fraud prompted regulators to develop the supervisory regulations outlined 
in the SACCO Society Act of 2008; this framework is expected to come into full force in late 2010. 
In preparation, the government of Kenya also created the SACCO Regulatory Authority (SASRA) to © Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
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supervise SACCOs with front-ofﬁ  ce operations. 
Madagascar
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l The  microﬁ  nance sector is spilt between the long-established informal co-operative and mutual sector 
and the more recently established professional microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs).
l  There is a sophisticated national strategy for microﬁ  nance and a highly structured legal framework and 
national promotion unit, which makes it easy to establish and upscale MFIs. 
l  Political instability has inhibited the expansion of MFIs as development aid has been suspended. Poor 
accounting standards also constrain MFIs.
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  MFIs had mixed fortunes in 2009, which was a turbulent year politically and economically. Some MFIs 
experienced delayed loan repayments, while others grew steadily.
l  A new credit information system has the potential to improve credit checking, though at present 
efforts centre on commercial bank reporting and linking data from new and old systems. 
l Larger  ﬁ  nancial institutions offering microﬁ  nance facilities are increasing the variety of products 
provided to clients.
l  There are early indications that efforts to improve the regulatory capacity of the Banque Centrale de 
Madagascar (the central bank) are bearing fruit.
Mozambique
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l The  microﬁ  nance sector, along with the general ﬁ  nancial sector, is still very underdeveloped, with 
almost 80% of the population unbanked. In addition, the ﬁ  nancial sector is still based on commercial 
banking, and regulated microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs) only have a small share of the market.
l  Mozambique’s economy is quite small and very poor, consisting of a handful of mega-projects (coal 
and gas mines) and 30,000 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). As a result, MFIs tend to be 
small, mission-driven organisations led by donor programmes, rather than commercial proﬁ  t seeking 
institutions.
l  The Bank of Mozambique (the central bank) is conservative and is still contending with other 
challenges, such as focusing on the use of local currency instead of the previous prevalence of foreign 
currency. (Business transactions conducted in foreign currency now constitute around one-third of 
the total, down from two-thirds in 2003).
l The  ﬁ  nancial sector is highly concentrated and lacking in competition. This reduces deposit-
mobilisation and contributes to high borrowing costs.Global microscope on the microﬁ  nance 
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Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  A new reporting framework for supervision of microﬁ  nance will ﬁ  nally be announced in 2010, after 
being developed by many international organisations over the past three years.
l  Mobile banking is beginning to develop at a broader level, as the ﬁ  rst telecommunications provider 
has been approved to partner with ﬁ  nancial institutions and offer services.
l  IFRS has been adopted as the ofﬁ  cial accounting reporting standard and is expected to be 
implemented in MFIs by the end of 2010.
l  A private credit registry is being developed with the International Finance Corporation, which is 
expected to facilitate the development of the microﬁ  nance sector.
Nigeria
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  There is an established regulatory framework for microﬁ  nance banks (MFBs). Many MFBs, however, do 
not comply with the regulations and the Central Bank of Nigeria lacks the capacity or sector expertise 
to supervise the banks effectively and enforce regulation.
l  Many MFBs are undercapitalised, owing in part to low capital requirements for local operations, and 
have poor management and governance. The sector has grown very rapidly, with laws being passed 
before appropriate regulatory capacity has been put in place. More than 900 MFBs were created in a 
very short space of time during 2008 and 2009.
l  Many of the microﬁ  nance providers established as Unit Microﬁ  nance Banks struggle to penetrate fully 
urban markets and establish a strong base from which to expand to rural areas. Moreover, regulations 
dictate that Unit Banks are only allowed to expand into more than one state after they own two-thirds 
of market share in their original state. Many rural areas and states remain underserved. 
l  The lack of reliable identiﬁ  cation documents is a challenge for developing credit information 
registries, as various forms of personal identiﬁ  cation exist. All forms have limited coverage and none is 
fully reliable regarding name, date of birth and address. 
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  The rapid emergence of hundreds of credit institutions and the onset of the global ﬁ  nancial crisis 
have led to fraudulent and opportunistic behaviour. This has caused a considerable decline in public 
conﬁ  dence.
l  The CBN has reconsidered its microﬁ  nance policy in light of the failure of numerous MFBs. The revised 
framework is expected to be developed by the end of 2010, and is likely to employ a three-tiered 
structure: a national-level microﬁ  nance licence; a state-level licence; and a rural licence. 
l  The operating costs of microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs) have risen, owing to infrastructure challenges 
(lack of consistent access to water, electricity, and Internet connectivity) and high and rising capital 
costs.© Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
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Rwanda
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  The regulatory and policy environment for microﬁ  nance is very strong, but has outpaced the capacity 
of microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs) to understand and comply. This is particularly true for accountancy 
and governance standards.
l  The majority of MFIs are located in urban centres, and competition in rural areas remains limited. The 
government has prioritised access to ﬁ  nancial services to the rural community. This may lead to some 
distortions in the short term, particularly owing to the large ﬂ  ows of donor subsidies directed at the 
sector, but ultimately should beneﬁ  t the industry by increasing ﬁ  nancial literacy.
l  Following the collapse of several MFIs in 2006 and in light of uncertainties regarding the tax regime, many 
Rwandans distrust ﬁ  nancial institutions and are reluctant to bring savings into the regulated economy.
l  Rwanda does not have a credit reference bureau (although there is a national credit registry within 
the National Bank of Rwanda (the central bank), which is seldom used by MFIs). Procedures for 
determining credit worthiness are generally informal.
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  In May 2009 the central bank issued microﬁ  nance regulation No. 02/2009. It has also formed a new 
Directorate for Financial Stability with a microﬁ  nance-speciﬁ  c department to supervise MFIs. The 
directorate has hired and trained 20 inspectors.
l  A new payments system law has been approved by parliament, and provides scope for mobile banking.
l  The government has launched a new initiative, Umurenge SACCO, to ensure that every local district 
has a savings and credit co-operative (SACCO) to hold deposits and provide micro-loans. Under the 
programme, the government will ﬁ  nance a declining proportion of the operating costs of 416 new 
SACCOs for a period of three years.
l  Rwanda was the top reformer in the World Bank’s Doing Business 2010 report, moving from 143rd to 
67th out of 183 countries. Among the reforms, investor protection improved substantially, from a 
score of 2 to 6.3 out of 10.
l  The Association of Microﬁ  nance Institutions in Rwanda (AMIR) has received ﬁ  nancial support from 
the government and several donors, and has launched a capacity-building campaign to improve the 
governance and reporting capacity of smaller MFIs.
Senegal
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l The  microﬁ  nance sector remains highly concentrated, with 85% of lending assets held by three major 
networks. Senegal is also home to many small mutual organisations and non-regulated microﬁ  nance 
institutions (MFIs), which have limited growth potential. 
l  Senegal has laws regulating MFIs, but there is a lack of regulatory capacity. Although the banking 
commission regulates the larger MFIs, the authorities have limited capacity to supervise the many 
small MFIs.Global microscope on the microﬁ  nance 
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l  A recent change in the legal framework is expected to be conducive to the formation of commercial 
MFIs and bank downscaling.
l  Transaction costs are high, making it difﬁ  cult to extend services on a large scale, especially to remote 
and rural areas. Mobile banking presents an opportunity to reduce the costs of network expansion. 
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  The prospects of full implementation of the new MFI regulatory framework are being weakened by 
delays in issuing new licensing instructions by the responsible regional body, the Banque Centrale 
des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO, the central bank for the West African region). As a result, new 
microﬁ  nance licences may be withheld.
l  A new law requires unregulated microﬁ  nance organisations—termed Groupements d’Épargne et de 
Crédit (GECs)—to either convert into regulated MFIs or merge into existing networks within two years. 
l  The deadline for full compliance with new accounting standards has been too ambitious, especially for 
those MFIs not afﬁ  liated with a major network (about 15% of the market as of June 2008). 
l  The government is actively investigating opportunities for mobile banking (m-banking) as a way of 
expanding microﬁ  nance to remote, rural areas. 
l  The authorities are also looking at ways of improving credit bureaus, although fees can reach as high 
as 9% per transaction, and pilots have yet to achieve popular acceptance. 
Tanzania
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  Tanzania has a very diverse market for microﬁ  nance, involving commercial banks, community banks, 
dedicated microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs), co-operatives and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs).
l  Although regulations covering the creation of deposit-taking microﬁ  nance entities (DTMs) have been 
in place since 2005, no NGO or co-operative MFIs have yet made this transition. This can be explained 
in large part by the complex funding structure and high capital requirements. 
l The  microﬁ  nance sector has begun to expand beyond lending and deposit-taking into insurance, 
leasing and transfers. Mobile banking technology has also emerged. 
l  The reporting standards and general performance of savings and credit co-operatives (SACCOs) 
remains under considerable scrutiny. The government launched The Co-operative Reform and 
Modernisation Program 2005-15 to improve performance and accountability, although it is unclear 
how successful this has been.
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  There has been an increase in the availability of insurance, leasing and transfer services. This includes 
a substantial deal signed between the First MicroInsurance Agency and the Savings and the Credit Co-
operative Union League of Tanzania (SCCULT, a representative body for over 1,000 SACCOs and their 
members).© Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010
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l  Tanzania has seen an increase in training and education about accounting and audit standards, 
delivered through formal and informal groups of MFIs.
l  Institutions in the sector, and microﬁ  nance banks in particular, have taken steps to strengthen their 
capital structures in the past year. 
l  A number of players from the telecommunications and ﬁ  nancial sectors have begun to develop and 
offer mobile telephone banking services during the last year.
Uganda
Key characteristics of the microﬁ  nance business environment:
l  The IMF rates Uganda’s ﬁ  nancial system as one of the most developed in the region. However, the 
microﬁ  nance sector is dominated by commercial banks, such as Centenary Bank and Equity Bank. 
Dedicated microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs) are concentrated in urban and semi-urban centres, 
charging relatively high interests rate and suffering from relatively low levels of efﬁ  ciency. 
l  Uganda’s tiered approach to microﬁ  nance regulation and supervision has created ﬂ  exibility and a 
solid framework for institutional development. 
l  That said, the regulatory requirements for institutional transformation are quite strict. As a result, 
most MFIs choose to continue operating as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or savings and 
credit co-operatives (SACCOs) and are not permitted to take deposits. 
l  A shortage of qualiﬁ  ed and well-trained staff has weighed on non-bank microﬁ  nance institutions;  
MFIs with commercial bank and deposit-taking status tend to attract the most skilled microﬁ  nance 
employees. 
Key changes and impacts since last year:
l  MFIs are struggling to compete with established commercial banks that have recently begun scaling 
down and attracting small savers.
l Uganda’s  ﬁ  rst credit bureau has started operating, and is expected to have an impact on the 
microﬁ  nance sector. (Borrowers with multiple loans is a growing concern, and there is no uniform 
client identiﬁ  cation system.) All regulated ﬁ  nancial institutions, including Microﬁ  nance Deposit-
taking Institutions (MDIs), will be expected to report negative client information to the Credit 
Reference Bureau. 
l  The acquisition of Uganda Microﬁ  nance Limited by Equity Bank in late 2008 is likely to inﬂ  uence 
the microﬁ  nance market, which had been dominated by Centenary Bank. Equity Bank is expected to 
introduce stronger competition and bring microﬁ  nance best practices from Kenya.
l Microﬁ  nance has recently begun to emerge in the northern part of the country, owing to improved 
political stability following agreements with rebels. 
l  As in other East African countries, many reports of misconduct surfaced in the past year in the SACCO 
segment, mostly arising from the global ﬁ  nancial crisis. There has been increased pressure on the 
government to regulate this sector, which has now become a priority. The Ministry of Finance is 
expected to develop a SACCO regulation framework soon.Global microscope on the microﬁ  nance 
business environment 2010
© Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010 61
Current issues in microﬁ  nance   
The microﬁ  nance market has grown enormously during the past decade. The sharp rise in lending has been 
driven by a huge inﬂ  ux of external funding from donors and social investors, and by the commercialisation 
of the market through initial public offerings (IPOs) from some of the larger microﬁ  nance institutions 
(MFIs). The impact of the increased availability of funding for MFIs has been a rapid growth in MFI 
portfolios in terms of the number of borrowers reached and the quantity and value of loans disbursed. 
The microﬁ  nance market has been mostly isolated from the current ﬁ  nancial crisis, which has 
profoundly affected mainstream ﬁ  nance globally. That said, the microﬁ  nance market is experiencing 
its own set of growing pains, driven in part by the breakneck speed at which it has been expanding. 
Indeed, many commentators see a need for a system of checks and balances to curtail irresponsible 
lending practices that have emerged in recent years. In the second half of 2009 the inability of some MFI 
borrowers to meet repayments on their loans led to community revolts against MFI lenders in Nicaragua 
and in the southern state of Karnataka, India. Several other countries continue to experience rising 
numbers of portfolios-at-risk (PAR)—loans that are more than 30 days overdue—including Bosnia, 
Morocco, and Pakistan, with PARs as high as 7% to 13% in some cases.1  
What is driving this rise in borrower defaults in a sector that traditionally has enjoyed the best 
repayment rates in the credit industry? Evidence from the locations listed above, and from other parts 
of the world, shows that some MFI customers are requesting and receiving more loans than before. This 
trend has been fuelled by the increase in ﬁ  nancing available for MFIs to on-lend, coupled with lax credit-
management practices. Recent news coverage shows that some MFI customers were borrowing from 
multiple sources simply because they could, as well as for consumption purposes. For instance, a 2009 
sector report on microﬁ  nance2 shows that one-quarter of MFI clients in Karnataka’s Kolar district have as 
many as ﬁ  ve loans, with three loans being the average.3 An examination of the four countries currently 
experiencing repayment crises showed that 20-40% of borrowers had loans from more than one MFI.4 
Anecdotally, this is conﬁ  rmed by interviews conducted by the Economist Intelligence Unit, which show 
that indebtedness is a growing problem, affecting locations throughout the developing world.
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Microﬁ  nance credit reporting
Extreme responses, such as the revolts in Karnataka, the No Pago movement in Nicaragua, and regulatory 
restrictions on MFI lending, do not address the underlying issues that create conditions for over-
indebtedness. In a market devoid of information-sharing, MFI lenders do not have the ability to identify 
customers that borrow from multiple sources, nor do they have a view of the overall level of indebtedness 
of their existing or potential clients. This information asymmetry characterises most principal-agent 
relationships, and its effects are now being felt in the microﬁ  nance sector. As long as the economy is 
doing well and most people are gainfully employed, multiple borrowing is not a problem; loans are 
generally paid on time, keeping non-payment rates low and microﬁ  nance portfolios strong. But when a 
business-sector slump leads to job losses and a decline in wages, borrowers often have little choice but 
to default. The inability to identify and curb indebtedness increases the risk of non-repayments, non-
performing loans (NPLs) and deteriorating portfolios. 
The fundamental case for credit reporting in microﬁ  nance is to alleviate the credit risk arising from 
information asymmetries. This is where credit bureaus come in. A credit bureau collects information 
from lenders and available public sources on a borrower’s credit history. Information on individuals and 
small ﬁ  rms is compiled into a comprehensive credit report that is then sold to creditors. Credit bureaus 
typically support the retail lending business by providing objective information on the creditworthiness 
of individual customers or small businesses. They allow lenders to make faster and more accurate 
credit decisions, thereby lowering default rates by 30-40% and increasing lending volumes.5 While 
credit reporting for retail and small business lending has evolved over the past century, uptake in the 
microﬁ  nance sector has been relatively slow.
Experience from Ecuador shows that credit reporting allows MFIs to monitor the portfolios of existing 
borrowers, assess their overall level of indebtedness, and make more informed lending decisions. This 
may involve renewing a credit line, denying an existing borrower more credit, devising ﬂ  exible pricing 
based on borrower credit histories and repayment characteristics, or developing ﬂ  exible product terms to 
better suit the borrower’s capacity to repay. In India, for example, the largest MFIs participate in a credit 
reporting system (under development) and use shared information to identify borrowers with multiple 
loans, capping the maximum exposure per borrower at Rs50,000 (around US$1,000) at any given time.6 
Credit reporting can also have a disciplinary effect on borrowers.7 One study showed that educating 
borrowers of a major MFI in Guatemala about the existence and use of a credit bureau improved borrower 
repayment rates.8 
Credit reporting clearly has beneﬁ  ts for MFI lenders, and could lead to cost savings and operational 
efﬁ  ciencies that have been demonstrated at regular ﬁ  nancial institutions. Even so, implementing 
microﬁ  nance credit-reporting systems is challenging. Fundamentally, many MFIs are simply unaware 
of the potential beneﬁ  ts of credit reporting and how it can support their operations. Moreover, many 
MFI lenders are wary of “information-sharing mechanisms,” both within and outside of their niche. 
In addition to issues of awareness and trust, several technical challenges impede the development of 
microﬁ  nance credit reporting. These include equipping MFIs with the right mix of technology and skills 
to capture borrower data and transmit such data to a credit bureau, and training MFIs to use information 
from the credit bureau in their lending processes.
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Yet another challenge lies in ﬁ  nding the right “price point” for MFI users of credit bureau products. 
MFIs typically make smaller loans (by value) than traditional lenders, with greater repayment frequencies. 
Standard credit bureau products are therefore neither suitable nor affordable for MFIs. The credit bureaus, 
for their part, grapple with being able to offer MFI-tailored products at prices that would be sustainable 
for the credit bureau’s own business model. These challenges notwithstanding, better integration of 
microﬁ  nance and credit reporting holds the promise of improving risk management and overall ﬁ  nancial 
stability for MFIs.
Risk management and deposit mobilisation 
While the microﬁ  nance sector has side-stepped the major consequences of the global ﬁ  nancial crisis, 
awareness of them has made risk management a priority for MFIs, donors and investors. As a result of its 
past focus on aggressive growth and expanded outreach, the MFI sector is now faced with overstretched 
and outdated systems, inadequate control mechanisms, and a lack of qualiﬁ  ed staff to manage complex 
new lending products targeting individuals and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). MFIs and 
donors recognise the need to design and implement risk management strategies to protect against large-
scale ﬁ  nancial losses, as well as the loss of reputation among clients, competitors, donors, and regulatory 
agencies. This in fact is the board of directors’ ﬁ  duciary role: to provide oversight and investment advice 
to management, in addition to recommending sound risk management practices. 
Risk management traditionally has been structured around four types of risk: credit risk; liquidity 
risk; market risk; and operating risk. For MFIs, however, there may be a need for an additional framework 
that captures other factors. These include fostering a “risk culture”, in which MFI employees and 
stakeholders understand the institution’s main sources of risk and the consequences of decisions for the 
MFI’s risk proﬁ  le. It also involves ensuring that appropriate risk structures and policies are in place to 
monitor the risks of the institution and designing and adhering to a risk-reporting schedule, including 
the dissemination to management of documents that lay out the identiﬁ  cation of risks, as well as their 
measurement and management on a continual basis. This last item deserves particular attention by MFIs, 
considering that the lack of consistent and adequate risk management reporting may have aggravated the 
problems that some MFIs experienced in 2009.
MFIs that are committed to regulatory improvements and the mobilisation of deposits face even 
greater challenges. MFIs that wish to become licensed as regulated deposit-taking institutions must not 
only meet capital, equity and ﬁ  nancial performance objectives, but must also comply with regulatory 
requirements for management and governance capacity, development of robust infrastructure, including 
appropriate data and information processing systems, and internal controls. In some countries MFIs are 
required to invest in building a system to implement a deposit programme before they can obtain approval 
to accept deposits, with no guarantees that the institution will receive the licence. 
The role of governance in the evolution of a strong risk management function goes beyond better 
policies and reporting; it also means developing staff who are well-trained in deposit products and services. 
A strong knowledge of the distinctions between deposit mobilisation and credit, as well as the unique risks 
associated with each, must begin with the board and management and be integrated at each staff level. The 
ability to build a professional staff committed to serving the public is key to the success of an institution.Global microscope on the microﬁ  nance 
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Risk management in all its forms is becoming increasingly important in the microﬁ  nance sector, both 
for credit and savings products. As more and more MFIs mobilise deposits to provide a wider spectrum 
of ﬁ  nancial products to their clients—while also diversifying their sources of funding—a well-tailored 
and practical risk management system will be essential. Governance with credibility and integrity is the 
cornerstone of building an institution capable of providing ﬁ  nancial access to the under-banked. It is 
also essential to developing a pool of knowledgeable, highly trained personnel in deposit services. In the 
end, institutions that strengthen risk management practices should ﬁ  nd it well worth the cost and effort, 
as sound risk management will ultimately be rewarded by customers’ trust and by the conﬁ  dence of the 
central bank. 
This analysis was prepared by IFC and MEDA.© Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2010 65
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Principles for the effective regulation and supervision of 
microﬁ  nance operations 
 Microﬁ  nance has been one of the great business success stories of the last decade. But the sector’s 
impressive growth and outreach has not been matched by a comprehensive supervisory and regulatory 
structure that reﬂ  ects its unique characteristics and risks. To close this gap, the Association of Supervisors 
of Banks of the Americas (ASBA) and the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF)—with support from the 
Swiss Trust Fund managed by the Inter-American Development Bank—engaged in a two-year consultation 
in Latin America and the Caribbean to prepare practical guidelines for regulating and supervising 
microﬁ  nance.
These guidelines seek to complement the standards and laws under which a country’s ﬁ  nancial 
institutions operate. Microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs) are subject to national standards and, in the 
majority of cases, international standards that allow for sound management of the ﬁ  nancial system. 
But international standards are not always applied with sufﬁ  cient rigour, and neither international nor 
national standards always consider the special nature of microﬁ  nance operations. There is, for example, 
a need to broaden the application of the Basel Core Principles (BCP) to create a legal framework that 
effectively regulates MFIs—but without imposing conditions that would impede their operations. Yet 
guidelines must also build on existing standards because MFIs and traditional ﬁ  nancial providers have 
a lot in common. With some adjustments, the majority of the Basel principles are applicable to the 
microﬁ  nance sector.  
The need to regulate and supervise banks rigorously is rarely challenged; the same cannot be said of 
the need to regulate MFIs. Although the majority of MFIs are not large enough to threaten a country’s 
overall ﬁ  nancial stability, they play an important role in providing ﬁ  nancial services to underserved 
populations with the potential to contribute to the economy. To do so effectively and appropriately, 
however, MFIs must align their activities with BCP principles. Proper microﬁ  nance regulation is also 
important for protecting consumers (depositors and borrowers) and correcting market imperfections (by 
increasing information to improve transparency and efﬁ  ciency). In sum, sound regulation helps ensure 
that microﬁ  nance clients are served by stable ﬁ  nancial institutions. Like all regulation, however, there is a 
cost; to be worthwhile the beneﬁ  ts must outweigh those costs. 
As microﬁ  nance is intended for those who would not otherwise have access to ﬁ  nancial services 
and involves small sums of money, it is easy to believe that the costs of regulation are too great. This 
perception is mistaken. Without proper regulation, MFIs might be tempted to take excessive risks, leading 
to, for example, over-indebted borrowers. Excessive debt creates losses that restrict the microcredit 
supply and eliminates a signiﬁ  cant credit source for an important segment of the population, reducing 
their ability to generate wealth. It also undermines a culture of timely payments, which supports the 
sector’s proﬁ  tability and sustainability.
The guidelines developed by ASBA and MIF are based on the principle that countries should have 
specialised expertise for monitoring microﬁ  nance and that regulations should be tailored for that sector 
and not merely copied from traditional banking regulation. The supervisor should have sufﬁ  cient sector 
knowledge to evaluate the strength of an institution and its plans, establishing appropriate minimal Global microscope on the microﬁ  nance 
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capital standards. The supervisor must have a trained, specialised unit to ensure the regulatory framework 
functions properly. There should be sufﬁ  cient resources to monitor over-indebtedness in the system, to 
continuously analyse risks, to identify warning signs and to implement policies in a timely manner. 
The regulatory framework should also incorporate risk management concepts, as these apply directly 
to microﬁ  nance. Strategic and reputational risk management is particularly important, since many 
institutions begin as non-proﬁ  ts entities targeting a speciﬁ  c client segment and eventually enter new 
market segments that they are less well equipped to serve. Credit risk management is essential because 
most clients are not part of the formal economy, limiting the lender’s access to useful client information 
and collateral. Operational risks must also be addressed to ensure proper lending methodologies are 
employed that are not overly prone to human, procedural or external ﬂ  aws. Although market risk is less 
of a factor, regulatory risk frameworks should also address foreign exchange risk and interest rate risk, 
which stem from the unique ﬁ  nancing structures these institutions employ. MFIs should adhere to policies 
that combat money- laundering and terrorism. 
Finally, the guidelines suggest deﬁ  ning micro-loans (or microcredit) explicitly in regulations, so that 
required client characteristics and the credit methodology utilised to service them are clearly deﬁ  ned. 
For example, a long-known element of success is ensuring that credit methodologies involve personal 
contact with clients. This should be standard practice. Policies for loan loss provisioning need to reﬂ  ect 
the short loan terms and high repayment rates that characterise microcredit portfolios. Speciﬁ  c rules for 
the treatment of interest rates, fees and penalties in case of arrears should also be included. 
This article was adapted from a publication by MIF and ASBA. The full document can be accessed at www.iadb.org/micamericas. 67 © Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2009
Appendix Global microscope on the microﬁ  nance 
business environment 2010
Methodology and sources
This index is the second year of a study that evaluates countries across regions despite poor data and 
often incomplete information. Much effort has been made to combine available secondary sources and 
primary legal texts with insights and information from sector stakeholders in each national context. 
Interviews were conducted with microﬁ  nance practitioners, experts, policymakers and consultants 
around the world between March and June of 2010 to inform the analysis in this study. Experts’ interview 
availability varied widely by region, and, in some cases, by country. A qualitative survey based on the 
microscope criteria was also administered to microﬁ  nance practitioners, consultants, and regulators 
worldwide between March and April 2010. Two hundred and twenty six stakeholders responded to the 
survey. The results were used to inform, challenge and conﬁ  rm scores and evaluations, as well as to 
provide additional contacts for interviews. 
The study criteria and methodology were developed in 2007 by the Economist Intelligence Unit 
research team in close co-ordination with MIF and CAF. The real-world relevance of these indicators 
was initially evaluated through in-depth interviews conducted with country experts and microﬁ  nance 
practitioners from the region. They have been further validated in 2007 and 2008 by their high, positive 
correlation with microﬁ  nance penetration ﬁ  gures. In 2009, these indicators were expanded to an 
additional 34 countries around the globe in co-operation with IFC. 
Based on consultations with senior MIF and CAF staff in 2007, the categories “Regulatory Framework” 
and “Institutional Development” were each weighted 40% toward the 100 point score while “Investment 
Climate” was weighted 20%. However, it is important to point out that, even with alternative weighting 
schemes that assign more weight to the last category (such as weighting each of the 13 variables equally, 
or weighting each of the three categories equally), the relative importance of the investment climate in 
shaping overall microﬁ  nance environments consistently emerged as secondary to that of the regulatory 
framework and institutional development.
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To score the indicators in this index, we gathered data from the following sources:
l  Personal interviews with regional and country experts, as well as microﬁ  nance practitioners and 
regulators
l  A global microﬁ  nance survey for sector stakeholders based on the Microscope study 
l  Economist Intelligence Unit proprietary country rankings and reports, especially Country Finance, 
Country Commerce and monthly Country Reports
l Scholarly  studies
l  Texts of laws, regulations and other legal documents
l  Websites of government authorities and international organisations
l  Websites of industry associations
l  Local and international news media reports
A new goal for this year’s Microscope was to increase the number and scope of practitioners 
interviewed. A large proportion of these were drawn from in-country sources, especially local 
microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs), national microﬁ  nance networks, and local ofﬁ  ces of multilateral 
organisations. These additional consultations have allowed for a more nuanced portrait of the business 
environment for microﬁ  nance than was previously possible. As a result, scores were re-evaluated and 
changed for some countries, even in cases where there were no actual changes in formal laws and 
regulations. 
For a full list of sources and interviewees, please refer to the full bibliography, available free of charge at 
www.eiu.com/sponsor/GlobalMicroscope, www.iadb.org/micamericas, www.caf.com/mipyme and www.ifc.
org/microﬁ  nance.
MIF staff provided the necessary data to measure the level of competition in Latin American and Caribbean 
countries. They began with MIX Market data, but complemented it with country-speciﬁ  c sources to 
improve data coverage and quality. This is used to calculate the Hirschmann-Herﬁ  ndahl Index (HHI).1 HHI 
calculations are based on microﬁ  nance portfolio size, rather than number of clients. 
HHI data for the rest of the world also came from MIX Market. In some select cases, 2008 data were used 
because 2009 data for these countries were not yet available. An extensive effort was made to assemble 
the latest available data for 2009, however, and the data in the model represent the most current 
information at the time of publication.
Scoring criteria
Indicators in the Microscope index are qualitative in nature, and scoring criteria for these are deﬁ  ned 
through a set of questions. These questions seek to measure not only the laws and standards governing 
the sector, but also their enforcement and practice. The criteria are open-ended, rather than formulaic or 
prescriptive. Consequently, scores are best understood after reading indicator justiﬁ  cations in the Excel 
model, as well as the scoring criteria. 
1. The HHI is a specific 
measurement of market 
concentration, that is of the 
extent to which a set of firms 
accounts for a proportion of 
output in a sector. The HHI is 
used as one possible indicator 
of market power or competition 
among firms. It measures market 
concentration by adding the 
squares of the market shares of 
all firms in the sector. Where, 
for example, in a market five 
companies each have a market 
share of 20%, the HHI is 400 + 
400 + 400 + 400 + 400 = 2,000. 
The higher the HHI for a specific 
market, the more output is 
concentrated within a small 
number of firms. In general 
terms, with an HHI below 1,000 
the market concentration can be 
characterised as low, between 
1,000 and 1,800 as moderate and 
above 1,800 as high.69 © Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2009
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For purposes of this study, MFIs are deﬁ  ned narrowly as those that provide “microcredit”; that is, loans 
to non-salaried workers that are typically less than or equal to 250% of gross national income per capita 
(GNI per capita) in size. Microcredit operations are carried out by different types of institution, some 
regulated by ﬁ  nancial authorities and some not.
The indicator scoring criteria for the Global Microscope are as follows:
Regulatory Framework
(1) Regulation of microcredit operations: “Are regulations conducive to microcredit provision by banks 
and other established ﬁ  nancial institutions? For instance, are banks free to set market interest rates, 
can they avoid excessive documentation and capital-adequacy ratios, and are they free from unfair 
competition from subsidised public programmes and institutions?”
l  Scoring: 0=No such regulations exist or regulations are prohibitive; 1=Regulations create serious 
obstacles; 2=Regulations create at least two such obstacles for MFIs; 3=Regulations create minor 
obstacles; 4=Regulations present no signiﬁ  cant obstacles
(2) Formation and operation of regulated/supervised specialised MFIs: “Is the legal framework conducive 
to the formation and operation of ‘specialised MFIs,’ such as greenﬁ  eld MFIs and upscaling NGOs 
transforming themselves into MFIs? For example, are specialised MFIs free to set market interest rates, 
can they avoid excessive documentation and capital-adequacy ratios, and are they free from unfair 
competition from subsidised public programmes and institutions?”
l  Scoring: 0=No such regulations exist; 1=Regulations exist, but multiple obstacles make formation 
very difﬁ  cult; 2=Regulations exist, although there are signiﬁ  cant obstacles; 3=Regulations exist with 
relatively few obstacles; 4=Regulations facilitate formation
(3) Formation and operation of non-regulated and non-proﬁ  t microﬁ  nance institutions (MFIs): “Is the 
legal framework conducive to the formation and functioning of microcredit operations by unregulated 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs)?”
l  Scoring: 0=NGOs are barred; 1=NGOs face many obstacles; 2=NGOs face some obstacles; 3=NGOs face 
only minor obstacles; 4=NGOs face no signiﬁ  cant obstacles
(4) Regulatory and examination capacity: “Do regulatory institutions possess a specialised capacity for 
the examination and regulation of microﬁ  nance provision?”
l  Scoring: Open-ended, as speciﬁ  c markers are not obvious and emerge from the interviews
Investment Climate
(5) Political stability: “How important are the internal and external threats to the stability of the serving 
government or the political system in general?”
l  Scoring: The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Political stability rating is a category score in its Risk 
Brieﬁ  ng. It is the average of ﬁ  ve individual scored indicators: Social unrest; Orderly transfers; 70 © Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2009
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Opposition stance; Excessive executive authority; and International tensions. 0=Extreme instability; 
1=Considerable instability; 2=Moderate instability; 3=Stable; 4=Very stable
(6) Capital market development: “Are local capital markets developed?”
l  Scoring: This score is based on the average of ﬁ  ve scores in the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Risk 
Brieﬁ  ng: Depth of ﬁ  nancing; Access to local markets; Marketable debt; Banking sector health; 
and Stock market liquidity. 0=Capital markets are undeveloped; 1=Capital markets exist, but lack 
depth and breadth; 2=Capital markets are lacking in either depth or breadth; 3=Capital markets are 
moderately well developed; 4=Capital markets are deep and broad 
(7) Judicial System: “Does the judicial system allow for speedy, effective, and consistent resolution of 
disputes?”
l  This score is based on the average of three scores in our Risk Brieﬁ  ng: Fairness of the judicial process; 
Enforceability of contracts; and Speediness of the judicial process. 0=Judicial system is extremely 
poor, corrupt or politicised; 1=Judicial system has several important faults; 2=Judicial system 
has strengths and shortcomings; 3=Judicial system is basically sound; 4=Judicial system is solid, 
incorruptible and free of political inﬂ  uence
(8) Accounting standards: “Are accounting standards in line with international norms (that is, US GAAP, 
IAS, IFRS)?”
l  Scoring: 0=There are no generally established accounting standards; 1=National standards exist, 
but are weak and ineffective; 2=National standards are established, but fall short of international 
best practices; 3=National standards are similar to or moving toward international standards; 
4=International standards are followed
(9) Governance standards: “Do governance standards of accountability and independence exist for 
corporations and institutions?”
l  Scoring: 0=Standards do not exist; 1=Standards exist, but are weak; 2=Modest and unevenly effective 
standards; 3=Signiﬁ  cant, if imperfect, standards exist in law and practice; 4=Standards of high 
accountability and transparency are followed in law and practice
(10) MFI transparency: “Do microﬁ  nance institutions routinely disclose their effective interest rates, 
conduct external audits and receive external ratings?”
l  Scoring: 0=MFIs rarely or never engage in such practices; 1=MFIs follow at best one such practice, and 
with uneven results; 2=MFIs follow some of these practices, with modest results; 3=MFIs follow most of 
these practices, with generally favourable results; 4= MFIs follow all these practices71 © Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2009
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Institutional Development
(11) Range of MFI Services: “Do MFIs offer a wide range of ﬁ  nancial services to low-income populations in 
addition to microcredit (e.g., insurance, savings, transfer of remittances, etc?)
l  Scoring: 0=MFIs do not generally offer additional services; 1=MFIs generally offer only limited services 
beyond microcredit; 2=MFIs generally offer a modest range of services; 3=MFIs offer a wide range of 
services; 4=MFIs offer a full, extensive range of services
(12) Credit bureaus: “Are there effective, reliable credit bureaus?” For instance, how comprehensive is 
the information on prospective borrowers that they provide, how widely accessible is that information 
(particularly in light of privacy restrictions), does it cover transactions with both regulated and non-
regulated ﬁ  nancial institutions, and does it provide more than just “negative” information about 
prospective borrowers (that is, defaults and arrears)?
l  Scoring: 0=Credit bureaus do not exist; 1=Credit bureaus are weak and unreliable in most of these 
ways; 2=Credit bureaus are weak in some of these ways; 3=Credit bureaus are weak in one of these 
ways; 4=Credit bureaus provide comprehensive information on the whole range of transactions and 
also include positive information about borrowers (on-time payment history, etc) 
(13) Level of competition: “How competitive is the MFI sector? Do micro-borrowers have a wide range of 
institutions from which to choose?”
l  Scoring: 0=There is little or no competition, with two or three institutions representing the majority 
of the total market portfolio, and the HHI value is over 2,600 ; 1=There is limited competition, and the 
HHI value is between 2,600 and 1,800; 2=There is a moderate level of competition among MFIs, and 
the HHI index falls between 1,800 and 1,000; 3=There is substantial competition and the HHI falls 
between 1,000 and 500; 4=There is a high degree of competition and the HHI value is 500 or lowerWhilst every effort has been made to verify the accuracy 
of this information, neither the Economist Intelligence 
Unit Ltd nor the sponsors of this report can accept any 
responsibility for liability for reliance by any person 
on this report or any other information, opinions or 
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